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A REPORT FOR OCB EXAMINATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ESCAPEE PROGRAM

PREPARED BY

OFFICE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRATION

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

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Part 1

SUMMARY REPORT

I. Purpose and Authority of Escapee Program

A. Origin of Program

Since World War II and the extension of Soviet control through Eastern Europe, thousands of persons have fled to the West in search of freedom, and they have been afforded material assistance under the major post-war refugee programs. In 1949, 1950 and 1951, however, with the approaching termination of these programs, it became increasingly apparent that the reception and living conditions afforded recent escapees from countries of the Soviet bloc in countries of asylum in Europe were unsatisfactory, and that U.S. interests in this group were not adequately secured. The escapees left their homes, friends, material possessions, and even families in the conviction that life in the free world would be worth the price, yet on arrival in the West found themselves in severely under-privileged status. Unlike expellees in Germany, Italy and Turkey, and East German refugees, they were without rights of citizenship, and by reason of their recent association with Communism, were considered as suspect on security grounds. They frequently found themselves in asylum among persons historically antagonistic to those of their national origin. The countries receiving them were already burdened with other refugees, and with surplus population and economic problems, and could afford only a bare minimum of assistance. In these circumstances, there was little opportunity for the alien escapee to compete successfully for local employment, and no organized facilities were available to arrange enduring resettlement elsewhere by overcoming the many disadvantages, deriving mainly from the very fact of escape. As a result, the majority of the new refugees, although of great concern to the U.S., were forced into debilitating inactivity in government camps or marginal existence as free-living persons, if indeed they were not held indefinitely in detention centers along with common criminals.

These circumstances created a negative psychological climate with respect to the major U.S. objective of securing the friendship of the captive populations of the Soviet orbit, and limited the effectiveness of specific operational projects concerning defectors.

The Soviets lost no opportunity to exploit the neglect of escapees by the West, with a view to lowering the prestige of the West on both sides of the Iron Curtain, to diminishing the stimulus for further escape, and to producing throughout the enslaved area the idea that escapees would be met with forcible repatriation by the Western authorities. Neglect and ill-treatment of escapees tended to confirm, on a world-wide front, repeated Soviet propaganda concerning alleged lack of concern of the West for the individual in distress. Indeed, the Soviets sought, through the medium of the Italian and Austrian treaties and otherwise, to insure that escapees would face detention, discrimination and starvation.

B. Basic Policy Guidance

In recognition of this developing situation, a series of policy directives were issued by the National Security Council and the Psychological Strategy Board looking toward corrective action.

NSC-ID 13 (January 19, 1950) first recognized the importance of adequate care for the select group of persons determined to be of positive value for U.S. intelligence, operational, or propaganda purposes. NSC 86/1 (April 3, 1951; amended June 4, 1953) broadened the coverage of the policy statement to include any Soviet or satellite nationals (including Communist China and East Germany) escaping from the control of the U.S.S.R. or countries of the Soviet orbit,

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whose escape, or whose utility after escape, would contribute significantly to the achievement of general U.S. objectives and aims with respect to the U.S.S.R particularly by placing maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power through threatening the regime's control of its population. This document also specifically recognized the fact that any successful use of defectors is dependent on their effective transition to life in the free world, making improvement in the treatment of escapees of critical importance.

Pursuant to the general statement of policy and intent contained in NSC 86/1, the Psychological Strategy Board developed specific plans for a program to employ, resettle, and care for current escapees from the Soviet orbit, supplementing the inadequate and uncoordinated facilities then existing (PSB D-18/a, December 20, 1951). The PSB plan provided for the establishment of a government organization "...capable of insuring or arranging the employment resettlement, and care of all escapees from the Soviet orbit who are not otherwise used and /which/ at the same time should be capable of providing certain necessary services to assist U.S. operating programs." (P. 9) A second phase of the psychological operations plan for escapees (PSB D-18a/1a, January 15, 19[illegible] established approved guidelines for use and exploitation of escapee activities.

C. Establishment of Program and Legislative Authority

In implementation of these directives, and on recommendation of the Departments and agencies concerned, the Escapee Program was authorized by the President on March 22, 1952, and funds were made available to the Department of State for its administration on April 7, 1952. Legislative authority for the European phase of the program in FY 1952 and FY 1953 was provided by Section 101(a)(1) (the Kersten Amendment) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended Certain additional projects in South Asia and the Far East were authorized and initiated in FY 1953 under Section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. In FY 1954 an amendment to Section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, was secured to make clear the intent of Congress to authorize assistance for escapees from Communism in Asia as well as Europe. A clear legislative record was made affirming the intent of Congress that care and resettlement assistance to Yugoslav refugees should be initiated, after Presidential determination under Section 513(b), under joint administration with the Escapee Program. This extension was proposed on the understanding that it does not involve Yugoslavs in the other objectives of the Program, and that assistance to Yugoslavs should not be exploited or publicized in any manner Legislative history in connection with Congressional presentation of the FY 1954 program also made clear the importance placed on permanent resettlement rather than continuing care and maintenance (Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S.2128, Senate Report No. 403, 83rd Congress, First Session, June 13, 1953, P. 61) and emphasized the need for assistance to refugees from the mainland of China (Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations in H.R. 6391, Senate Report No. 645, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, July 25, 1953. P. 9).

On December 3, 1953, the President made the further determination in the amount of $9,000,000 required for implementation of the FY 1954 program.

II. Establishment of Program

The program developed by the PSB was assigned to the Department of State for implementation, and initial funds in the amount of $4.3 million were made available on April 7, 1952. A series of operational decisions were immediately required concerning: (A) eligibility criteria; (B) operational priorities; and (C) Program organization.

A. Eligibility Criteria

Within the broad limits set by the authorizing legislation, eligibility criteria were necessary to assure that the modest resources of the program would

be applied to those escapees within the total refugee population in Europe offering maximum advantage in relation to U.S. objectives and with highest priority to recent escapees, particularly those essentially stranded and without status in the countries of first asylum. Ethnic refugees and expellees granted de facto rights of citizenship in their countries of asylum, such as East Germans and Turk-Bulgars, and older refugees who had been extended benefits under previous refugee programs and shown to be unresettleable were consequently excluded. All post-January 1948 escapees from satellite countries and post-1947 escapees from the Soviet Union are included and given full program services. This category includes persons defecting from Soviet or satellite missions anywhere in the world. Also, persons eligible for immigration to the U.S. under Section 3(c) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, located for the most part in Western European countries of secondary asylum, are assisted for resettlement purposes only. These priority groups are established by administrative action, and other persons or groups have been assisted at the request of other U.S. agencies. In Fiscal Year 1954 coverage is being extended to selected groups of Greek ethnic refugees, and under a project administered jointly with the Escapee Program, to recent escapees from Yugoslavia. The estimates of 20,000 escapees made at the beginning of the program have been shown to be substantially accurate as the caseload was fully registered. As of September 30, 1953, there were 14,210 escapees registered with the program and still on hand in Europe, the largest concentrations being in Germany, Austria and Italy. Among the nationality categories, Czechs, Hungarians and Poles are the most numerous in that order. In addition, 3,447 persons eligible under Section 3(c) are registered in Western Europe. Of the additional groups to be covered in Fiscal Year 1954, it is estimated that 3,000 of the 10,000 Greek ethnic refugees in Greece will be aided and 10,000 Yugoslav refugees, largely concentrated in Austria, Trieste and Italy.

As of November 30, 1953, 7,316 refugees, in addition to those listed above, had been resettled or were awaiting departure.

B. Operational Priorities

The operational assignment of the program included both care and maintenance and resettlement. It was apparent, however, that the negative psychological climate in Europe could only be removed by overcoming the many competitive disadvantages of the escapees as migrants, and developing opportunities for enduring resettlement. Overseas movement for which there were no facilities available was consequently established as the principal operational target. Interim reception and care activities were, of course, developed concurrently by supplementing the minimum resources which local governments and voluntary agencies could afford, to bring about a significant and visible improvement in the conditions afforded escapees in Europe.

C. Organization

The administrative apparatus required to plan and carry out the program was developed in the initial organizational phase of the program, during which staffs were assembled in Washington and overseas, basic operating policies and procedures were formulated, and the unclassified objectives of the effort were set before the voluntary agencies who were to assume responsibility for local implementation of care and resettlement support activities under contractual arrangements. Operations were concurrently initiated in May, 1952 while the diplomatic mission staffs in Germany, Austria, Geneva, Italy, Trieste, Greece and Turkey were being augmented through the addition of Escapee Program cadres to meet the needs of this additional program. Urgent projects were promptly undertaken to meet the most pressing needs of escapees, and registration and surveys were initiated in order to formulate integrated programs of assistance in the countries of first asylum.

By January, 1953, more than 10,000 escapees were registered and receiving assista nce, and over 2,800 had been resettled. Integrated country programs had been developed to meet the needs in each of the primary countries of first

asylum in Europe, and an overall field coordinating unit was established in Germany. Working relationships with the voluntary agencies and the local governments had been firmly established. Accordingly, in the interest of more rapid and efficient program administration, steps were taken to decentralize authority to the field. Authority was delegated to the field coordinating unit (OFC) in Frankfort, within the framework of overall control by the Washington office, to approve assistance projects, to make the necessary funds available for their implementation, and to make further delegation of authority to the field units consistent with adequate overall program control.

Under the President's reorganization action concerning the administration of foreign affairs, operating responsibility for the Escapee Program was transferred from the Department of State to the Office of the Director for Mutual Security (later the Foreign Operations Administration) on July 1, 1953. Foreign policy guidance continues to be provided by the Department of State.

III. Operational Accomplishments and Plans

A. Resettlement

As of November 30, 1953, 7,316 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting transportation under the auspices of the program. This number represents a substantial achievement in light of the serious disabilities of the escapees, the increasingly selective approach to immigration by the major receiving governments, and the virtual breakdown of organized resettlement machinery which had existed during the period of IRO and Displaced Persons Commission operations. Reestablishment of the resettlement pipeline required time-consuming work with local governments, with intergovernmental organizations and particularly with the voluntary agencies with respect to development of operational procedures and strengthening agency staffs in all areas sufficient to assure priority attention to program requirements.

Basic transportation arrangements were made in June, 1952 by contract with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, under which any escapee nominated by the program is moved by ICEM to his port of embarkation anywhere in the world at a cost of $125 to the Escapee Program, and under terms which assure that the escapee arrives at his destination unencumbered by debt and without charge to the country granting the visa. This arrangement acts as a spur to the issuance of visas. The more difficult task, however, is to enable the escapee to qualify for a visa, for the group is customarily considered less desirable, or is less able to qualify, as immigrants than Western Europeans.

First, the escapee is understandably suspect on security grounds by reason of his recent association with Communism. To counter this situation, and to assure the integrity of the program, a thorough screening is performed, similar to that followed for immigrant visa applicants for the U.S. All program assistance is withdrawn upon disclosure of credible evidence that an escapee is a Soviet or satellite agent, a voluntary member of the Communist Party, an anarchist, a criminal or abusive of the aid extended him. A discriminating judgment is required in the application of these criteria by the officers who evaluate the files. The fact that the neglected or disappointed escapee, the returnee, or the suicide is quickly and effectively exploited by Communist propagandists requires that assistance be made available to escapees on the broadest possible basis; on the other hand, there are obviously certain categories of escapees whose assistance from U.S. Government funds would be inappropriate.

Secondly, the escapees are frequently lacking in the skills and languages required by immigration countries. To meet this need, the program has undertaken over 25 training projects in languages and vocational skills, conducted in the refugee camps, in established vocational schools, and in

conjunction with apprenticeship schemes. Thirdly, the escapee is customarily without resources or friends in the free world to assist him in securing an immigrant visa. To fill this need, over 90 projects have been undertaken to provide resettlement counselling and visa processing services, and to conduct visa search activities in Canada and Latin America. Each escapee has available an agency counsellor who prepares a resettlement dossier, assures that immediate needs are fulfilled, and develops a suitable plan of action. Dossiers are presented to prospective employers in receiving countries, and other services are extended to assure effective resettlement.

In addition to the above, special procedures are promptly established to assure maximum advantage to escapees from any special immigration programs. For example, Escapee Divisions are already working with the voluntary agencies to assure early registration and preparation of necessary documentation for processing under the Refugee Relief Act.

Although only 748 Russian escapees are now registered with the Escapee Program, 234 were resettled in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1954, the majority of these under Section 3(c).

B. Care and Maintenance

At the outset of the program, deficiencies in the care and maintenance category, though more easily remedied than the breakdown of resettlement machine were highly visible and dramatic. Escapees in Turkey were eating only dried beans and powdered milk; those in Greece had only makeshift shoes of canvas and rope, and lived in crowded vermin-infested barracks; in Italy escapees were housed in a prison-like compound with common criminals; nearly all lacked basic medical and dental facilities. The situation in each country varied in accordance with the differing policies of countries of asylum toward escapees, the level of services provided by the local government and by voluntary agencies, and with available opportunities for gainful employment. In each area the most urgent needs were promptly attended to, and gradually a comprehensive program was installed, covering both in and out-of-camp escapees. Over 40 projects have been undertaken to improve reception and lodging for newly arriving escapees. For example, the Escapee Program cooperated with the German Government and local voluntary agencies to carry out a thorough renovation of that portion of Camp Valka where escapees are now housed after arrival in Germany. Escapees arriving at the military intelligence debriefing center at Linz, Austria, were being fed only condemned army "10-in-1" rations from Vienna stockpiles. Moreover, the supply of clothing and amenities was inadequate. The Escapee Program, in cooperation with the camp administration, provided fresh vegetables, meat, eggs, milk and other food to the center, and furnished escapees with new clothing, amenities, medical supplies and individual mess equipment. By these measures a substantially better atmosphere for successful interrogation and debriefing was established.

Over 70 clothing and food projects throughout Europe have been established to supplement existing resources. The means adopted for administration vary from coupon books issued directly to escapees, which permit individual selection of foodstuffs and apparel, to provision of special meals and bulk issue of clothing and bedding for groups using institutional facilities. Special arrangements are made wherever appropriate for the celebration of religious holidays in accordance with national customs. At Christmas, in cooperation with the military facet of "Operation Reindeer," extra food was provided, parties were held, and escapees donated toys and other services to local charities.

Medical and dental services are provided in over 25 projects, and particular emphasis is placed in this regard on meeting not only routine

requirements, but on raising medical levels to meet immigration standards. Services in this category include prostheses, diet kitchens for post-TB cases, rest camps in Switzerland and special feeding for refugee children, and emergency hospitalization. For example, two recent escapees in Austria who were injured in crossing the border, have been given prolonged hospitalization, one of them after being rescued by an ambulance despatched by the Escapee Program into the Russian Zone of Austria.

Arrangements have been made for individual attention to Soviet escapees in special centers at Karlsfeld, Munich and Kaiserslautern operated by the Tolstoy Foundation and American Friends of Russian Freedom. The per capita expenditure for assistance to Russian escapees is more than twice that for other program eligibles.

C. Future Operations

Care and maintenance assistance has been developed to the limit imposed by local political conditions, and will be continued along present lines. The resettlement program will be given continuing emphasis and will be constantly shaped to meet developing opportunities. Commencing in Fiscal Year 1955, it is anticipated that the Refugee Relief Act, together with intensified efforts in Canada and Latin America, will provide a substantial increase in the number of available visas. As continued resettlement efforts reveal a new "hard core", local integration, which is a relatively expensive process, will be undertaken. It is estimated that in Fiscal Year 1954 a total of 12,000 persons, including 625 locally integrated, will be resettled, and in Fiscal Year 1955, 16,700, including 2,000 locally integrated, will be resettled. A net remaining caseload of 9,900 including 5,520 Yugoslavs, and a cumulative resettlement total of 33,900 is estimated for July 1, 1955.

D. Funds

In Fiscal Years 1952 and 1953 the program had available for obligation a gross total of $6,555,334 for all activities, including program direction and $270,000 for projects in the Far East and South Asia. Of this amount $5,218,218 had been obligated on June 30, 1953 and $2,495,047 expended by September 30, 1953. Of a total request for $9,000,000 for Fiscal Year 1954 for program costs in all areas, $7,500,000 has been apportioned by the Bureau of the Budget. A submission in the amount of $6,500,000 for operations in Fiscal Year 1955 is pending before Bureau. The obligations in Europe, covering projects with 22 voluntary agencies have been nearly equally divided between care and maintenance, resettlement suppo and transportation. Austria, Germany and Italy have required the greatest funds, reflecting the size of the caseload in those areas.

IV. Far and Middle Eastern Operations

In order to assist in securing U.S. political, psychological and intelligenc interests on a wide geographical basis, it was considered important to extend the program as a medium for these interests to the Middle East, South Asia and the Fa East. This was done on a limited scale and in full recognition of the fact that the problem is not capable of complete solution. The activities have been initia by selection of individual practical projects, the priorities being determined by the definable contribution which would be made by any undertaking to U.S. politic psychological or intelligence objectives. Firm eligibility criteria such as are applied in Europe are not feasible in these areas; in general, however, perferenc is given to groups or individuals who are recent refugees, and who in some respec offer advantages to the U.S. Assistance is limited further to permanent resettle or other aid not involving a continuing commitment. The groups which have to dat been selected for resettlement aid include approximately 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang who were granted asylum in Kashmir, and approximately 25,000 of the most highly trained and educated of the estimated 1.25 million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. It is proposed to continue and expand these efforts in FY 1954 and 195 to include resettlement under the Refugee Relief Act, and modest assistance to the refugee housing and employment situation in Hong Kong. Also included in the FY 19 program proposal is a project for contribution to the transportation costs of White Russian refugees permitted to leave Red China through Hong Kong.

V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROGRAM IN TERMS OF U. S. OBJECTIVES: SERVICE TO OTHER AGENCIES

The activities of the Escapee Program, and the information growing out of the close relationships with escapees, local governments and voluntary agencies, enables the program to provide substantial assistance in support of U. S. objectives and programs.

A. Behind the Iron Curtain

It is a major objective of U. S. foreign policy to secure the friendship of the enslaved populations of the USSR and the other Soviet-dominated countries; the Soviets seek to preclude such friendship by cutting off information from the West. There is substantial and increasing evidence that large numbers of people in Eastern Europe and Asia are not in sympathy with the Soviet regime. For a few, opposition can take the form of escape, which fact is a dramatic demonstration of resistance to Soviet tyranny and has an important psychological impact on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, when the persons who so escape are received with suspicion and are treated with contempt and neglect in the countries of asylum, and are provided a marginal standard of living, this quickly and inevitably becomes known behind the Iron Curtain with resulting damage to U. S. interests far greater than if escape had never taken place at all. By contrast, the provision of decent care and opportunities for escapees stands as a practical demonstration of U. S. aid to those who risked their lives for freedom, a symbol of continuing friendship for those who must remain behind, and a signal of hope for the restoration of freedom within these lands in the future. Moreover, the fact of escape stimulates disaffection in the oppressed homeland because the departed individual serves as a symbol to the community as one who chose freedom. Thus, greater and greater resources are required to be devoted to the unproductive police surveillance apparatus, and by consequence the Soviet system becomes increasingly a contradiction to its claims to popular support.

In recognition of the above, and of the fact that the existence of the Escapee Program must be known behind the Iron Curtain if it is to be effective, priority attention has been given to the gathering of raw data suitable for use in support of these themes in overt and covert psychological operations directed toward the Soviet orbit. It should be emphasized that the organizational responsibility of the Escapee Program extends only to the development and distribution of information arising out of program operations. The scope, volume and priority of exploitation given this information falls within the policy and operational responsibility of the media agencies. The scope and effectiveness of such exploitation is therefore governed by the activities and policies of those agencies and is essentially beyond effective control or influence by the Escapee Program. The data has centered around: (a) conditions behind the Iron Curtain which prompt escape; (b) border controls and security measures required to prevent escape; and (c) assistance given by the Escapee Program. Materials have included first-hand interviews and affidavits by escapees, photographs and factual reports of program activities, particularly concerning resettlement.

The Program has taken the initiative in securing the development of informational policy statements for the guidance of overt media, and in establishing distribution channels and cooperative relationships with all U. S. official and other agencies capable of exploiting the materials. These agencies include Radio Free Europe, VOA, other USIS media, Radio

Liberation, RIAS, and European information media. The program has also devoted major efforts to support of the U. S. Delegation to the United Nations, and during the last session of the General Assembly Ambassador Lodge was supplied material which provided the basis for a convincing refutation of Czech charges of U. S. subversion and violation of the U. N. Charter under the Kersten Amendment.

As a means of providing credible material for overseas dissemination, the Program has also placed a substantial volume of human-interest stories and program information in domestic U. S. publications.

B. Service to Other Agencies

In addition to materials for exploitation given to media outlets, the Program is in a position to provide a wide range of services to government and private agencies concerned with policy or operational aspects of the escapee situation. Among these are:

(1) Provision of information on individual escapees and on escapee populations to facilitate the planning and operations of other government programs. For example, the Escapee Program has done special surveys at the request of CAS on Baltic escapees and on all escapees resident in Belgium. Information on all Soviet escapees is made available to CAS. A detailed statistical study was prepared in connection with NSC-143. All vital statistics on registered escapees in Western Europe has recently been recorded on IBM punch cards for faster servicing of requests of this nature.

(2) Facilitation of recruitment of escapees for military, operational or leadership training assignments under other U. S. programs. Program divisions are prepared to assist by identification and pre-selection of candidates, preliminary testing and similar services. For example, the Escapee Program is currently exploring with EUCOM and USAREUR the establishment of a special center in Germany for Labor Service Unit and Lodge Act recruitment in which the Escapee Program would assist by pre-selection of candidates and payment of transportation costs.

(3) Assistance in processing applicants for U. S. immigration under the Refugee Relief Act, through preparation of dossiers, security screening and similar activities, thus reducing the burden on consular officers and facilitating the carrying out of the Act.

(4) Cooperation with voluntary agencies and special organizations such as Free Europe Citizens Service in the identification and coordination of special undertakings on behalf of escapees or other refugees beyond the scope of the program. As illustrations, the Escapee Program has distributed radios to escapee camps in countries where FECS has no representative, and has pre-selected for the National Committee for a Free Europe individuals for attendance at the Free University at Strasbourg.

(5) Cooperation with intelligence agencies in the operation of debriefing centers through rehabilitation of quarters and facilities, and the provision of Welcome Kits, food, clothing and bedding. This assistance has contributed to creating a friendly climate at the centers conducive to successful debriefing.

(6) Coordination of program activities with other U. S. Government projects, such as advising military authorities concerning the best allocation of foodstuffs under "Operation Reindeer", and distribution of supplies to escapee and refugee camps.

(7) Assumption of responsibility in whole or in part for the care and/or resettlement of individual escapees of particular interest to other government agencies. To date, the Escapee Program has provided care and/or resettlement services for 112 persons referred by CAS, and has resettled 60 persons referred by USAREUR.

C. Governments of Asylum

Escapee groups often create political and economic problems within the countries granting asylum, become the objects of local political agitation, and are the subjects of concern by humanitarian groups everywhere. Escapee Program assistance is employed in such a way as to minimize the problems created by the presence of escapee groups, to improve standards of care afforded locally, to ameliorate harsh practices, and most important, to maintain policies of political asylum in the several countries of initial entry.

With the single exception of Turkey, local governments have carried out their basic responsibility for providing at least minimum care and maintenance of escapees. Supplemental assistance rendered by the Escapee Program has been administered without derogating from this responsibility, and in fact a useful cooperative relationship has been developed between the governments and the program in such matters as shifting camp populations and sharing costs of capital improvements in camp facilities. The Escapee Program has exercised its influence to improve attendant conditions within the jurisdiction of local authorities, such as amelioration of unduly harsh security measures, restrictions on freedom of movement, opportunity to secure interim employment, and similar matters. For example, the escapee who arrives in Italy has generally been detained in special prison camps (such as Fraschetti) along with common criminals. The program has endeavored and has been successful in obtaining the cooperation of the Italian Government in giving escapees in Fraschetti more liberal treatment and it has also persuaded the Government to move the Fraschetti escapees to a much more attractive camp at Mercatello, which is largely reserved for escapees.

D. Free World

The program has significance to the entire free world in terms of its ability to gather and tell the story of the escapees. The escapee story, adequately told, exemplifies the Communist terror in simple, basic, easily-understood terms which the average man can fully comprehend and appreciate. This inherent human appeal is multiplied by the circumstances of danger so often surrounding escape. The program serves as a point of focus for the escapees themselves and as a point of correlation for gathering their stories and projecting them throughout the countries and to the citizens of the free world, including the United States, on which the burden of effort against the Communists must rest.

VI. SUMMARY

VI. SUMMARY AND NEED FOR CONTINUING SERVICES

The conditions currently obtaining in Europe are in sharp contrast to those obtaining at the outset of the program. An escapee arriving in the West is customarily taken into initial custody by local police or security agencies. Although the Escapee Program has no direct association at this stage, it has exerted its influence with local governments to assure continued political asylum and to keep detention periods at a minimum required for security purposes. The escapee is then usually released to a U. S. debriefing center, where the program has cooperated with intelligence authorities in providing an atmosphere conducive to productive questioning. At the end of the debriefing, the escapee is released to a camp or free-living status, and is registered with an appropriate voluntary agency for care and resettlement assistance. All basic needs for food, clothing, bedding, medical care and lodging are provided, vocational training and language courses are undertaken. A resettlement dossier is built, and the full resources of a network extending throughout the free world is brought to bear on developing a suitable immigration opportunity. Concurrently, a security file is built on the escapee to assure that no undesirable person is aided. Through these methods, every real need of the escapees in rebuilding their lives is met. To date, material aid has been given to over 22,000 persons in Europe, including over 7,300 escapees firmly resettled. Under somewhat differing circumstances, nearly 4,000 persons have been aided in Kashmir and the Far East.

The facts of continued escape, of political asylum, and of organized facilities for care and resettlement are real, and cannot be controverted; the earlier negative values have been overcome, and there now exists a firm factual basis for a positive psychological advantage over the Soviets.

The operational job, however, is not complete. There still exists a large group of persons in Europe who, while living under satisfactory conditions, still require opportunities for overseas resettlement or local integration. Soviet escapees, who offer a premium advantage in terms of U. S. interests, will require further specialized treatment as the overall caseload diminishes. Activities in the Far East have not begun to tap the latent potential in that critical area. It is therefore essential that the services of the Escapee Program continue if the advantages already won are not to be dissipated.

Part 2

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM

I. Situation at Beginning of Program

At the beginning of 1952, persons who crossed the border from an Iron Curtain country into Western Europe found themselves a peculiarly disadvantaged group. The International Refugee Organization which had been established to care for the great numbers of World War II refugees terminated on January 31, 1951, and soon thereafter all large-scale resettlement activities ceased. Even those persons who had escaped while IRO was in existence were at a disadvantage because the IRO, founded primarily to take care of World War II displaced persons and refugees, was late in accepting new arrivals into Western Europe for care and resettlement. Further, to qualify for immigration to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act, a person must have been in Europe prior to January 1, 1949. Therefore, anyone who arrived after that date was ineligibl for migration to the U.S.

The countries bordering the Iron Curtain are the countries with large refuge populations or surplus populations of their own nationals or of common ethnic origin. Germany, the largest of the peripheral countries, had received some 12 million refugees and expellees from Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Austria had 50,000 displaced persons and refugees, together with more than 200,000 German ethnic nationals who had not been accepted into Germany and had been compelled to remain in Austria. Italy had a greater population than it could feed or employ. Greece, upset by recent warfare, had hundreds of thousands of its own people homeless as a result of that war and in addition had received some 10,000 Greek ethnics expelled from Albania and Bulgaria. Turkey had 160,000 ethnic Turks expelled from Bulgaria whom it was seeking to re-integrate into its economy. With these native or psuedo-native populations to care for, the border nations had little inclination and little means to support foreign nationals. There was no mechanism in existence to find new homes for them overseas.

The voluntary agencies which had been instrumental in caring for and re-settling refugees under IRO had reduced or terminated their activities. Those which remained in general had converted their organization from a resettlement to a welfare one. Those escaping from the Iron Curtain were small in number and activities in their behalf were only incidental to the voluntary agencies' operations in behalf of the much greater number of needy refugees and local inhabitants in whom they were interested.

Persons escaping from the Iron Curtain were perforce illegal entrants into their countries of asylum. In many instances they were tried as illegal border crossers and fined or jailed. In Germany, under Allied occupation, they were granted asylum without difficulty, though sometimes they were tried as illegal border crossers and jailed for a short period. In Austria those eventually entering the American Zone were fined or imprisoned for three days. Those entering the British and French Zones of Austria were sometimes sentenced to three to six months forced labor on Austrian farms. In Italy, male escapees from behind the Iron Curtain were sent to what was, in fact, a prison and were not allowed to leave its confines. In Greece, because of Communist agents attempting to infiltrate, every escapee was viewed as a security threat; they were placed in camps and on islands, were closely guarded, and underwent such other security measures as five roll calls a day and frequest bed checks. In Turkey they were taken immediately to a security enclosure which was not open to Allied observers but where their treatment was known to be gravely unsatisfactory.

There was little opportunity for employment for these escapees, who generally did not know the local language. In addition the local governments were hard-pressed to find employment for their own nationals. Consequently, if any employment was available to an escapee, it was either as unskilled labor or in under-cover employment in violation of local regulations at a wage considerably

below the going rate for native employees. In Germany, Austria and Italy, the governments accorded welfare assistance to the escapees consistent with their ability to render such assistance to their own nationals. In Germany and Austria the assistance was of an acceptable nature but was inadequate to meet the demands if Allied political and psychological warfare objectives were to be served. In Austria, the local assistance amounted to some $9 a month. In Italy the government gave minimal assistance. In Greece, the living condition of the escapee was so low that many of them wished they had never left home, and the Greek Government's attitude was completely apathetic. Seventy-five escapees slept in a single unheated room; the bunks were in three decks, sometimes with as many as three persons sleeping in one bunk. The escapee slept in his clothes, since the only bedding given him was one thin blanket to serve both as mattress and covering. In Turkey, for those escapees not confined in the security prison the diet consisted of dried beans and milk provided by voluntary contributions. The Turkish Government gave nothing to the welfare of these recent arrivals.

These conditions could not but disserve U.S. objectives. The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe in broadcasting to the captive populations natural tried to produce a favorable picture of the West in contrast to the oppression behind the Iron Curtain. The escapees found, on the contrary, conditions of indifference and neglect to their welfare. Some, driven to desperation, returned to their Communist homeland where they were effectively utilized by Soviet and satellite propaganda media to document their charges of cruelty on the part of the West toward the little men, of forced repatriation, and of lack of asylum to those who would escape. Further, it was incompatible with the American humanitarian approach to all in need to leave these derelicts afloat or the sea of European surplus humanity.

II. Who the Escapees Are

A. Eligibility Criteria

The Escapee Program deals only with a small fraction of the world's refugees. The legislative authority of the Escapee Program (the Kersten Amendment) permits assistance to a broad category of persons. However, assistance under the Program is accorded primarily to certain priority categories which, within the limitations of funds available, were established administratively for the purpose of achieving maximum impact with respect to those recent escapees from Russia and the satellite countries from whom there can be derived some psychological advantage in support of official U.S. policie and objectives. These categories are as follows:

1. Nationals of Soviet Russia who escaped on or after January 1, 1945
2. Nationals of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe who escaped on or after January 1, 1948
3. Members of Soviet and satellite diplomatic and quasi-official missions who defect in other countries throughout the world
4. Individuals of special interest to other U.S. agencies who can be assisted within the limits of the broad legislative authority of the Program
5. Nationals of Yugoslavia who escaped from Yugoslavia on or after January 1, 1948
6. Selected groups of Greek ethnics
7. Refugees from Communism in areas other than Europe selected for Program assistance on the basis of U.S. interest.

There are two main reasons for establishing the January 1, 1948 priority dateline for escapees from the satellite countries: 1) in order to include the large number of Czechs who fled Czechoslovakia after the coup in February, 1948 and who are of great psychological potential, and 2) in order to exclude those refugees of no particular psychological importance who have been in the refugee state since World War I or those who were uprooted between September, 1939 and January 1, 1948 and who, in the main, constitute the unresettleable hard core residual IRO eligibles. Moreover, the inclusion of the hard core DPs could be calculated, on the basis of the IRO experience, to result in no measurable Program achievements in their behalf and would have constituted a straight relief-type obligation for the U.S. Government for an indefinite period of time.

The dateline for the eligibility of escapees from Russia, however, was moved back to January 1, 1945 because of the peculiar psychological significance of the Russian nationality group and because of the limited number of Russian escapees who could qualify under the January 1, 1948 eligibility criterion. In view of the overwhelming importance of assisting Soviet Russian escapees in any exploitable manner, it may prove desirable to extend the date for this group still further backward.

U.S. Missions abroad have been advised that members of Russian and satellite diplomatic and other missions who defect in other countries throughout the world are eligible for Program assistance as required and appropriate under the circumstances. The only such defection which thus far has required Escapee Program assistance concerns the case of Marion Wolak, a chauffeur who defected from the Polish diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv. Wolak has been receiving maintenance assistance under Program auspices and is being helped to emigrate to Canada.

The Escapee Program is prepared, within the limits of legislative authority to waive eligibility requirements upon request of any U.S. agency in favor of assisting any person who is of special interest to such agency. A case in point is that of Otto Poppenberg, a scientist and an East German refugee. Although assistance for escapees or refugees from East Germany is authorized under the

Kersten Amendment, it was determined administratively generally not to extend Program assistance to persons who have the privileges and obligations of citizenship of a country outside the Soviet orbit. In the case of Poppenberg, however, an exception was made and assistance provided on the direct request of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that the Soviets were soliciting Poppenberg to return to East Germany and his return would be undesirable and might constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

Yugoslav escapees are eligible for Escapee Program assistance beginning in Fiscal Yeal 1954. Despite the fact that they are not directly factors in the political and psychological purposes underlying the Program, they were declared eligible for the following reasons:

1. Assistance to escapees from Yugoslavia supports U.S. political objectives in opposing and attempting to overcome the autocratic character of the Tito regime.

2. The neglect and despair of Yugoslav escapees is made known behind the Iron Curtain and is understood as symbolic of neglect for escapees of all nationalities.

3. It is difficult to explain the discrimination against Yugoslav escapees when official U.S. policy does not distinguish between brands or degrees of Communism.

4. Administration of Program assistance in refugee camps housing both escapees from Yugoslavia and other eligible escapees was difficult and aroused animosities and discontent in the camps.

The extension of Program benefits to selected Greek ethnics serves U.S. political, psychological, and intelligence objectives. Most importantly, the inclusion of Greek ethnics will encourage the Greek Government to continue to grant asylum and relief to non-Greek escapees. Such assistance will also encourage a continuing flow of small numbers of refugees of Greek ethnic origin from Communist areas which might cease if no aid were forthcoming. Assisting even a few in this category to emigrate will benefit the U.S. policy of relievi over-population pressures within Greece and will elicit Greek support of the U.S. effort to strengthen the Migration Committee (ICEM).

II. B. The Escapee Population

The current caseload of first priority eligibles comprises about 14,500 escapees who have arrived west of the satellite frontiers since January, 1948. This is the group for which the Program was primarily established and in which U. S. interests are primarily centered, although the group is small by comparison with war and post-war displaced persons populations.

These 14,500 are not a single uprooted mass of people displaced as a result of military action or other war-time chaos or expelled by an edict or a change of boundary, as past refugee and displaced persons groups have been. Rather they are the relatively few who have succeeded in penetrating the carefully contrived satellite security barriers individually or in small groups at various points all along the periphery of the Soviet orbit. They come from all areas of Soviet controlled Eastern Europe, and from all social strata and vocational backgrounds. Each is a separate case - an individual history of persecution, oppression, arrest, and finally the decision to risk escape to the West. Each case leaves a circle of friends and family behind, most of whom know the reasons for the flight. In effect this lays the groundwork for highly effective psychological warfare and intelligence activities. The point of contact in undertaking either of these activities is the escapees. It is from them that the most recent information on all aspects of Soviet economic, military, and other activity in all parts of the Soviet orbit can be obtained. It is their friends and families still at home, who have been in closest contact with the conditions which cause disaffection who are the prime target of VOA and other media in disseminating news of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Escapee Program.

All the satellite nationalities are represented in the current caseload. The largest nationality category are Czechs, of whom there are 4,500. A large part of these are recent arrivals. Czechoslovakia is the most recent victim of Soviet subversion and the extremely harsh measures necessary to maintain control have resulted in a continued widespread disaffection.

There are nearly 4,000 Hungarians, the next largest nationality category, despite the fact that the Austro/Hungarian border is the most rigorously protected segment of the whole Iron Curtain. There are relatively few Russian nationals. One reason is that economic life in Russia itself is somewhat less repressive than in most of the satellites where large parts of the scarce resources are shipped off to buoy the Russian economy and military establishment. Another is that the border controls on the Russian frontier exceed all other in severity and thoroughness. As a result, most of the very few Russians now escaping are military or government officials stationed in East Germany or the satellite countries rather than citizens fleeing directly from inside Russia, so that though there are fewer of them, they are more important for intelligence purposes.

With regard to the age and sex composition of the escapees, two-thirds are male (9,500), of whom the majority are single and over three-quarters are between 16 and 50 years of age. About half of the females are single. Two-thirds of the females are between 16 and 50 years of age.

Of the total caseload of current eligibles, about 4,000 are skilled workers, and 2,400 are professional or semi-professional.

Of the 14,500, about 6,000 are in camps, and the remaining 8,500 are living in private homes or on their own. In Germany, most of the in-camp escapees are at Camp Valka (Nurnberg) and Camp Foehrenwald (Munich); in Austria, at Camp 1002 (Wels) and Camp Glasenbach (Salzburg);

in Italy, primarily at Camp Mercatello (Salerno); in Trieste, primarily at Camp Prosesco; in Greece, primarily at Camp Lavrion (Athens); and in Turkey, at the Red Crescent farm camp north of Istanbul.

Assistance projects are undertaken to provide the needed food, clothing, medical care, and to secure early departure for permanent resettlement on behalf of the out-camp escapee as well as those housed in camps. The method of administering the assistance is, of course, modified.

While firm statistics on the 10,000 Yugoslavs are not yet available, estimates indicate that the age and sex breakdowns will be proportionately equal to the breakdown on the current eligibles caseload. The occupational breakdown will show a slightly larger proportion of agricultural workers and slightly smaller proportion of skilled and professional workers. This is in keeping with the general character of the escapees from the Balkan area, as opposed to those from Czechoslovakia and the northern satellites who include a higher proportion of skilled and professional workers.

There are approximately 3,000 escapees not included in the above figures who arrived in Western Europe prior to 1948 and who are eligible for U. S. visas under Sec. 3(c) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. None of these are housed in camps and most of them, although they cannot be considered integrated or resettled, are not in dire need of the basic food, clothing, and other necessities which are provided for newly arrived escapees in the countries of first asylum. Counselling and visa procurement assistance activities of the Escapee Program are extended to aid in the permanent resettlement of these 3(c) cases, who constitute the last remaining portion of the group for whose benefit the Displaced Persons Act was passed. These cases have provided a disproportionately large part of the resettlement cases to date because of the ready availability of visas for these people as opposed to the necessity to produce visas for the other escapees.

III. How the Program Operates

A. General Method of Operation

The Escapee Program provides assistance to escapees primarily by operating through and supplementing the activities of the local governments of asylum, of voluntary relief agencies and of international organizations. It encourages improved levels of assistance by the local governments and enters into contracts with the voluntary agencies for the provision of supplementary care and maintenance and resettlement assistance to escapees.

B. Organizational Relationships

1. U.S. Escapee Program Staff. The Escapee Program staff includes a small Washington office established in the Office for Refugees and Migration, Foreign Operations Administration, for program direction and policy guidance; an Office of Field Coordination located at Frankfort with responsibility for the review and funding of individual country programs, inspection and coordination with other concerned U.S. agencies, multilateral organizations and participating voluntary agencies; and Country Units established within FOA missions assigned to Germany, Austria, Trieste, Italy, Greece and Turkey responsible for detailed implementation of approved programs and projects. Activities in areas where no permanent staff is assigned are administered from FOA/W with the cooperation of U.S. diplomatic mission personnel. (See organization chart appended.)

2. Local Governments. The Escapee Program provides supplemental assistance to escapees in addition to the basic care and maintenance given by the governments of countries of asylum. Reception and care projects undertaken on behalf of escapees through the Escapee Program are fully coordinated with the asylum and relief policies of the local governments, which provide the larger portion of the assistance received by escapees. Escapees are housed in existing reception centers or refugee camps maintained by the local governments. Escapee Program food projects provide for rations to supplement the necessarily minimum rations which these governments provide for their large refugee population which are usually only at an organized relief level. It is difficult for the countries of asylum to raise this level, even with outside help, because of local political and economic situations which inhibit any higher level of subsistence than is available to the local population including other refugees and persons on public relief.

3. Voluntary Agencies. Qualified American and local voluntary agenc have been taken into the fullest possible partnership in the implementation of the unclassified portions of the Escapee Program, and carry out its major operating activities through projects authorized and provided by the Escapee Program under contractual arrangements. Non-governmental agencies are not, of course, engaged in the sensitive security, reception, and exploitation phases.

The agencies have cooperated in coordinating their efforts to assure maximum effective utilization of Program resources, and have enabled the Program to initiate needed projects in camps jointly occupied by eligibles and non-eligibles by assuming the cost of assistance to the latter group. Continuing consultation with the agencies is held at all levels, and the relationships have in nearly all instances been highly satisfactory.

4. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. The Escapee Program has entered into a contract whereby ICEM under normal circumstances will transport any escapee requested by the Program from his place of residence in Europe to the port of debarkation in the country of immigration at a fixed per capita cost to the Program. The transportation facilities of ICEM are used to take advantage of an organization established and equipped to facilitate the movement of migrants, on a fully coordinated basis and at economical cost. Close liaison is maintained with ICEM at every level to insure that there is no

duplication of services between the two programs. The Migration Committee program is directed toward facilitating the movement to underdeveloped areas of surplus populations in Europe including refugees, but does not provide for any specific priority for escapees. The great majority of persons aided under ICEM are indigenous Western Europeans, selected from a manpower pool numbering in the millions of persons who are frequently preferred as immigrants by receiving countries. In view of their small numbers, and the basic disadvantages inherent in their situation, the special efforts exerted by the Escapee Program are necessary if the considerable numbers of escapees are to be resettled. By virtue of its concentrated effort in behalf of escapees, the Program has the effect of increasing the overall number of persons who emigrate from Europe in relief of its surplus population problem.

5. Other U.S. Government Agencies. There is close coordination with other U.S. Government agencies concerned with the Program in Washington and in the field on matters of Program operating policy but with major emphasis on the exploitation of Program results and how this is best accomplished. There is not only regular informal consultation on a continuing basis with the Washington staffs of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Operations Coordination Board, but there is also an Inter-agency Liaison Group composed of representatives of these agencies which meets to consult on operational matters of mutual interest. There is also liaison with the responsible officers of the Department of State on the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.

In the field, intensive effort has been devoted to the firm establishment of interagency liaison procedures both at the country and regional levels. The substance of such relationships includes positive assistance by the Program to intelligence elements in the interrogation of escapees; resettlement and other assistance for certain escapees sponsored by USAREUR and CAS; provision of raw material on Program accomplishments for exploitation by VOA and RFE; identification and presentation of escapees for recruitment into military units under the Lodge Act by USAREUR; consultation with U.S. EUCOM (J-3) on utilization of escapee manpower in Labor Service Units; and coordination of materials from Escapee Program Units, peripheral reporting units, Public Affairs officers, military intelligence agencies, VOA, RFE and CAS in support of U.S. positions in the General Assembly of the U.N.

6. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has as his primary function the legal and political protection of refugees prior to the acquisition of citizenship. UNHCR also administers material aid under a Ford Foundation grant of $2.9 million, which is being devoted primarily to East German refugees, and lesser amounts under the High Commissioner's Emergency Fund and the IRO Trust Fund. Careful liaison arrangements have been established between the Escapee Program and the principal office of UNHCR at Geneva and between country representatives to assure a full exchange of operational information and to avoid overlap and duplication of effort.

C. Escapee Program Contract and Purchase Procedures

Country programs are developed by the Escapee Program Chief who insures that all necessary program needs and activities are covered by projects which are implemented chiefly through contractual arrangements with participating voluntary agencies. He also insures that there is no duplication between the activities carried on by the various agencies in behalf of the Program and brings about inter-agency coordination to this effect. The large number of agencies, each with a defined caseload, means that one activity, such as provision of clothing, may require several project contracts. As a result, a majority of the contracts are for amounts below $5,000. A total of about 500 contracts have been let by the Program.

When the responsible Escapee Program officer determines that it is in the interest of the Program to undertake a project or activity and that funds

are available, negotiations are undertaken with a qualified voluntary agency to submit a proposal for the execution of such project. The financial provisions of the proposal are reviewed by the FOA Controller and Executive Officer, after which the FOA Contract Officer draws up and signs the contract. The Executive Officer is responsible for determining that funds have been allotted to cover the financial provisions of the contract.

Contracts usually provide for payment to the agencies on a reimbursib basis. However, when necessary in the interests of the Program, agencies are given contract advances to permit them to provide the staff and facilities to undertake Escapee Program projects. Such advances are liquidated before the completion of the contract by charging to the advance agency requests for reimbursement. In no case has an outright grant been given an agency, although this procedure could be followed in exceptional cases if necessary to U.S. interests.

The Chief of the Escapee Unit concerned is responsible for the direct administration of contracts, for evaluation of the performance thereunder, and for making or having made by the FOA Mission Controller or other qualified officer, end-use audits where considered necessary. Payments are approved by the Escapee Program officer in charge and certified to by the FOA Certifying Officer.

Under certain conditions it has been found advisable to purchase supplies and services directly rather than by contract, or to use direct purcha in conjunction with contractual arrangements for distribution and administrativ services. Under these circumstances the Escapee Program office, after proper clearances with the FOA Executive Officer, issues a letter of intent or purchas order to a supplier for such services. The same safeguards are applied under these circumstances as are used in regular FOA local procurement activities.

D. Initial Operations

As soon as the President authorized the Escapee Program in the spring of 1952, action for its operation was assigned to the Department of State, whic not only had a basic interest in the program because of its importance to American foreign policy, but which also had in the Office of the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons a trained staff which was immediately available to develop and direct the program in its specialized aspects. Two days after the Presidential announcement, U.S. Missions in the countries where it was planned to establish country units were informed of the proposed organizational plan, and asked to give comments and recommendations on the plan and its implementation in terms of costs, personnel, and other problems of initiation. The diplomatic missions in Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, and Turkey were instructed to undertake urgent projects to meet the most pressing needs of escapees and intensive efforts were made to augment the staffs of the missions for this purpose. The Office of Field Coordination (OFC) in Frankfort was established to direct and coordinate the European operation. Concurrently, initial projects were undertaken with the voluntary agencies on an experimental short-term basis as a means of developing and refining program operations and of meeting the most urgent needs. At this point, also, the voluntary agencies were staffing and equipping their organizations to meet the requirements of the progra Prior to entering into extensive activities, it was also necessary to register escapees and determine their program eligibility.

By August 1952, thirty officer personnel had been appointed and eighteen were actually on the job. By this date also the following activities had been undertaken by the program.

1. A contract had been negotiated with ICEM to provide overseas resettlement transportation to escapees;

2. 362 persons (most of whom had previously held visas but lacked funds) were given transportation assistance in resettlement;

3. Supplemental care projects had been negotiated with the NCWC, the WCC, the LWF and the World YM/YWCA;

4. Goods and services had been provided to a number of escapees. Included were 1,000 new mattresses, childrens' shoes and standard layettes for babies, and work clothes to outfit escapees engaged in camp or community work projects;

5. In Germany an extensive project of assistance had been undertaken for the escapees housed at Camp Valka, including clothing, repairs to barracks, counselling, and recreation equipment;

6. In Austria facilities had been set up at Wels to process escapees, and 123 persons were being readied for departure for Canada;

7. In Italy a plan had been drawn up for NCWC to meet clothing, medical anddental needs for certain escapees;

8. In Greece the refugee camp at Lavrion had been decontaminated and footwear provided to eligible escapees.

The remainder of calendar year 1953 was absorbed in building the organization and securing a qualified staff; developing program policies, standards, and operating procedures; enlisting the cooperation of the voluntary agencies in the implementation of program activities; developing joint relationships with international agencies such as ICEM and the U.N. High Commissioner fc Refugees; negotiating with local governments on basic arrangements; and with the location, identification, and registration of the escapees.

On the basis of these activities, it was possible by January 1953, to outline the total program required to satisfy U.S. objectives and to allocate the funds for its execution. There was also a decentralization of authority and responsibility to implement the approved program under policy and operations guides issued by Washington. At this time, more than 10,000 escapees were registered and receiving assistance and over 2,800 had been resettled.

By the close of Fiscal Year 1953, when the Program was transferred from the State Department to the Foreign Operations Administration, assistance was being rendered to 17,500 escapees; 5,205 escapees had been resettled; and $5,218,218 had been obligated.

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Section III E

Importance of Voluntary Agencies

From the outset of the Escapee Program, the voluntary agencies have been an essential part of its operation. The agencies have participated in the formulation of procedures for carrying out the Program and were offered the opportunity to share fully in its development. At the inception of the Program, the agencies agreed to the following points:

a. The Escapee Program enters into contractual and project arrangements with American agencies only when those agencies are registered with the Voluntary Foreign Aid group of the Department of State, later transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration.

b. Projects are worked out by the agencies under general supervision and guidance of the Escapee Program, with primary emphasis on promoting resettlement.

c. Agencies engaged with the Escapee Program within any given country coordinate their activities to prevent overlapping or duplication of projects and to insure an effective country-wide program.

d. Determination of which agencies participate in the Escapee Program in any given country is dictated by the size and nature of the problem and the Escapee Program does not undertake projects with any agency simply for the purpose of recognition or to permit the establishment of an agency mission in a country where the Program is already adequately covered.

e. The agencies require extra staff to assure urgent and complete coverage of their responsibilities for escapees on a country-wide basis. The cost of maintaining a larger staff is met in part by the Escapee Program when extra staff are required for identifiable extra activities occasioned by the agencies' participation in the Escapee Program.

f. Agencies meet frequently to coordinate with each other and with the Office for Field Coordination at the European Headquarters level and with the Escapee Program office in Washington in order to insure uniformity and to prevent duplication.

g. Security matters are the sole responsibility of the Escapee Program and agencies cooperate as directed in this regard.

h. Any agency personnel using the Program as media for any activities other than those covered by projects developed by the Escapee Program are removed at once if requested by the Program.

These principles have guided the relationship of the Escapee Program with the voluntary agencies and have been formulated and carried out in consultation both with the Program and with the agencies.

The voluntary agencies have a definite importance in the Escapee Program both as regards the operational aspects of the Program and its exploitation in connection with its basic objectives. Some of them are concerned exclusively with the escapees as such. These are, accordingly, well represented in the Escapee Program and receive encouragement consistent with their potential contribution.

The agencies do particularly significant work in the resettlement field. By virtue of their organization along nationality or religious lines, the agencies maintain close contacts in the countries of potential resettlement with persons of their same national or religious origins. The agency through these contacts is thus able to produce

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numerous concrete opportunities for employment, housing, and assurances for escapees which otherwise would not be forthcoming. The effect of these activities is to increase the overall rate of escapee resettlement.

In addition to their activities in support of resettlement, the voluntary agencies are able through their counterpart or affiliated agencies in the countries of first asylum to accomplish a great deal more in the way of care and maintenance than could any outside agency. For instance, in Germany the CARITAS, the counterpart of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in America, has been a vehicle for rendering considerable support for out-camp escapees.

With respect to initial reception and subsequent care, the agencies can be particularly effective in winning the confidence of the escapees and extending initial welcome to him, since the escapees during the first period after his ordeal of crossing the Curtain would naturally gravitate toward persons of his own nationality or religious belief. In many instances, assistance through the agencies has been a vital factor in promoting the confidence of the individual escapee and in securing his utmost cooperation in his dealings with U. S. officials.

The agencies' role in the exploitation of the Escapee Program has three main facets. (a) They are at times particularly well qualified to assist in publicity connected with the Escapee Program. For example, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees was most successful in publicizing the resettlement of Libuse Cloud and other passengers who escaped in the Freedom Tank. Such religious agencies as the National Catholic Welfare Conference are in a position to publicize activities in favor of escapees through its church organizations and communication organs. The Tolstoy Foundation publicizes the Escapee Program widely in its monthly bulletins.

(b) Agency representatives speaking in the mother tongue of the refugees can be used to great advantage by the Voice of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Radio Free Europe in broadcasts to the Iron Curtain area. Knowledge among the captive populations of the productive activities of an agency organized along their own nationality to deal with escapees from their own country has a symbolic import to the political objectives underlying the Escapee Program in particular and U. S. objectives vis-a-vis the Iron Curtain area in general.

(c) The infiltration of news from the West through the Iron Curtain is facilitated and stimulated by the inclusion in the foreign language press and religious press in the U. S. and other nations of Escapee Program news items which result directly from the agencies' participation in the Program.

In recognition of the primary importance of the Russian escapees to the psychological objectives which underlie the Escapee Program, specific attention has been given to those agencies which deal only with Russian escapees. While the average per capita amount made available to all agencies per person on its caseload is $101, the amounts made available for the Russian agencies to each escapee on their caseload averages $277 per person. This indicates the increased emphasis which is devoted to the more important groups of escapees. In addition, it might be noted that whereas the pre-1948 arrivals from other than the Russian area have only their transportation costs to the U. S. paid, those who have arrived since 1948 have the entire cost of their resettlement processing paid by the Escapee Program and in addition receive full care and maintenance.

As of September, 1953, the United States Escapee Program had $2,104,000 in contracts with 22 voluntary agencies. The voluntary

agencies, of course, undertake activities only of an unclassified nature.

The Escapee Program does not bear the entire cost of the operations of the voluntary agencies in favor of escapees. Instead, in recognition of the supplementary role of the Escapee Program, the Program supplements the assistance which is given by the voluntary agencies. It is estimated that the local government pays 68% cost of the assistance given to escapees; that the voluntary agencies bear 21% cost; and the Escapee Program 11%. The agencies themselves estimate that they have given a total of $1,371,500 worth of goods and services to the escapees under projects which they have undertaken in consultation with the Program. A list of the voluntary agencies, with the amounts of United States Escapee Program contracts with the agencies and of the agencies' estimates of the costs to them of undertaking the Escapee Program projects is appended.

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III. F. Security Screening

The fact that the neglected or disappointed escapee, the returnee, or the suicide is quickly and effectively exploited by Communist propagandists to the detriment of the program and the objectives it serves, requires that assistance be made available to escapees on the broadest possible basis. On the other hand, there are obviously certain categories of escapees who are undeserving of assistance or for whom assistance from U. S. Government funds would be inappropriate. A discriminating judgment in applying eligibility criteria is required to avoid conflicts in maintaining good security and in attaining maximum program impact.

Program assistance is made available immediately upon prima facie evidence that an escapee meets the normal eligibility criteria. Such assistance is withdrawn, however, upon disclosure of credible evidence that an escapee is:

(1) an agent of Soviet Russia or of a satellite country;

(2) a member or former member or affiliate of the Communist Party, or other organization regarded inimical to the U. S. unless such membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or when the person was under sixteen years of age, or is or was a member by operation of law, or for the purpose of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of living, or in the case of former members, there is substantial evidence that he is actively opposed to the principles and doctrines of Communism or other such groups;

(3) an anarchist;

(4) a criminal (other than a political offender) who has committed a felony or is habitually guilty of minor offenses who is escaping to avoid prosecution;

(5) abusive of assistance, or who has been resettled or integrated locally, or who refuses to take advantage of reasonable resettlement opportunities.

Appropriate program assistance to any such person may be continued, however, where it would serve the interests of the United States in the psychological, intelligence or other fields.

Escapees generally arrive in the West without valid papers or any identification and by reason of their recent origin in Soviet dominated countries must be considered suspect on security grounds until credible information concerning their background can be developed. Procedures have been established in all countries where the Escapee Program operates for the investigation of escapees in order to determine that they are eligible for continued program assistance. Generally, these procedures are the same as are utilized by U. S. Consuls in investigating quota visa applicants for the United States. The evaluation may be less rigid in some cases, however, because of the different purposes to be served by the program.

In Germany and Austria, where there is the biggest caseload, experienced security officers are assigned to the Country Units. They have the benefit of contact with the intelligence interrogation reports, local police and intelligence sources, consular files, U. S. military files, local interviews, cross interrogations and other sources in finally determining the eligibility of the escapee. In Trieste, the responsibility of screening escapees has been undertaken by a Joint U. S.-British

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military intelligence team. In Rome, Greece, and Turkey, where the case-load has not justified the establishment of a separate investigative staff the background information on escapees is developed by the Consular and Security sections of the regularly established diplomatic missions in those countries. A trained security officer is assigned to the Office of Field Coordination to coordinate and supervise the security program on a regional basis.

IV. - What the Escapee Program Does for Escapees

A. Types of Assistance

To meet the basic U.S. objectives already outlined, the Escapee Program has set as its prime operational goal the early achievement of self-sufficiency for the escapees which in the large majority of cases means overseas resettlement. To this end, it has directed its efforts to helping escapees to overcome the basic disadvantages with which most escapees are faced, namely, lack of documents of identity and status; lack of security clearance; lack of foreign languages; lack of friends; lack of skills; and lack of the minimum requirements of clothing, food, and health necessary to gain acceptance for resettlement. It is the objective of the Program not only to meet these basic needs, but to give the escapee a level of assistance which will place him in a favorabl position in relation to other candidates for resettlement.

Projects contributing to the attainment of this objective fall into two broad categories. The first of these is interim care and maintenance, which includes projects to provide reception and to furnish food, clothing, and medical and dental care to escapees awaiting resettlement. Projects are also undertaken to secure and maintain suitable living quarters in which to house the escapees.

The second category comprises projects for resettlement assistance which includes registration; aid in obtaining the documents necessary in order to secure visas; visa processing; counselling to aid in finding emigration opportunities which are suitable in view of the escapee's training, experience, and language; orientation, language, and vocational training in cases where this is necessary for successful resettlement. (Projects are also undertaken in certain major resettlement countries to secure sponsors, housing, and employment for escapees in order to increase the visa potential).

In the performance of these activities, the Program supplements the considerable contributions of the local governments in countries of asylum toward basic care and maintenance, and otherwise, the resources of voluntary agencies, and multilateral organizations.

B. Care and Maintenance

The Escapee Program administers care in a way to emphasize the importance of the individual. For instance, the escapee is given a ticket similar to the gift certificate so familiar in America, which he then presents to a local clothing merchant and is allowed to select clothing which meets his own tastes and his particular needs. Thus, rather than having to maintain stock-piles and warehouses, and to be able to issue only mass-type clothing, the Program is enabled to make the escapee feel that the American people are trying to see that he, himself, gets what he wants to wear. This approach is not overly expensive, since the merchants have been willing to offer substantial discounts in return for the large volume of business which the Escapee Program gives them.

The Escapee Program, as is any relief program, is faced with the difficult determination of how high to raise the standard of living of its clients. It is one of the major difficulties of any such program to distinguish between enough and too much. The comparatively high living standards of Germany, Austria and Trieste are in contrast to the austerity in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. If this standard is raised too high, escapees who are living better than they have for the past several years are likely to neglect or even oppose resettlement opportunities and, through the demoralizing procedure of long waits in camp for resettlement, to become accustomed to living on charity and to refuse attempt to find them employment or resettlement. Further, if the Program is not adapted to individual needs, goods issued are likely to be sold in order to obtain pocket money which can be spent on items of food which suit the escapee's taste, or on drink, or otherwise dissipated. It is the tightrope which the Escapee Program must walk to see that sufficient is given to the escapee to insure that

his individual needs are met, and yet not to make life so comfortable as to lead him to resist resettlement.

Another problem in the administration of care is the living standard of the local populations in certain areas. This difficulty is perhaps best illustrated by the quotation from a recent report from the Escapee Program Mission in Greece: "Because of the extreme poverty prevailing throughout Greece and the particularly low standard of living in the villages adjacent to the camps housing the majority of the political refugees, one had to proceed with caution in the development in these camps of a program of care and maintenance. Some of the more obvious things were done first in such a manner as not to reveal any immediate increase in the standard of living for the refugees, including supplementary feeding, dental surveys, and essential property maintenance and repairs. Later, as we made major improvements in the camps, the local population in Lavrion began to show some signs of resentment. Deputations were made to the Mayor concerning the improvement in living conditions. Unfortunately, the week we initiated major changes and improvements in the camp at Lavrion, a mining company in that community laid off 850 people. The Mayor of Lavrion with whom we established liaison in the development of our program resolved the situation quite well, pointing out how much money the camp was spending with the local merchants and indicating that the refugees were not causing any disorder or local security problems. Later, to help the local city government, a contract was made for the use of the city showers by the escapees during reconstruction of the camp's shower facilities. The local population and the government gradually became accustomed to the idea that through improvement in the care and maintenance program, individual refugee morale improved and with this the refugee made a better impression with Selection Missions and presented a better appearance when photographed for resettlement dossiers." This same problem exists to a certain extent in each area in which the Escapee Program operates.

In some areas escapees ineligible for program assistance are housed in the same camps as are the eligible escapees. This, of course, poses considerable difficulties since it is impracticable, if not impossible, to provide certain selected residents of the camp with goods and services while withholding them from others. This has been true in Valka, the largest and most infamous of the refugee centers in Germany, where the great majority of the residents are not eligible for Escapee Program assistance, but are rather ex-Displaced Persons in the main refused for resettlement during the operation of IRO. It was also true initially in Trieste, Greece, Italy and Austria. It has been possible to separate eligibles from ineligibles and to move the eligibles into separate establishments in Austria, Trieste and Italy. It has not yet been possible in Germany or in Greece. Issue of clothing to eligible escapees in Greece was considerably delayed because the voluntary agencies were unable from their own resources to supply clothing to the ineligibles and friction, strife and disorder would have arisen had the eligible escapees been issued clothing while those ineligible remained in their shabby attire. For this reason, it was elected to provide persons being resettled with a new outfit in which to start their new life in their new home. Eventually the voluntary agencies were able to accumulate sufficient stocks of clothing so that a combined issue to all the residents of the camp was possible with the Escapee Program furnishing clothing for its eligibles and the voluntary agencies clothing to the others on their caseloads.

Special care considerably above that given to the average escapee has been administered to certain selected cases presented to the Escapee Program through other interested Government agencies.

C. Food

The purpose of the food program is to supplement the food provided to the escapees by the local government or by his own effort so that they will have a diet which will equal the standard of the surrounding population, will keep them in good health, and will enable them to maintain their physical condition at a resettleable standard.

The food program includes both in-camp and out-camp population and is designed not only to reach minimum standards necessary to maintain health and morale, but also is related to specific dietary deficiencies and specific groups such as expectant mothers, post TB cases, children, and invalids.

In each country, a comprehensive food program has been initiated, except in Trieste where Allied Military Government maintains a sufficiently high food standard for all refugees. The average daily caloric level for each escapee is about 2400, or approximately 400 calories above the amount received from local sources. For example, in Greece, in-camp escapees received only two meals per week in which meat was included. A third high protein meal was arranged for by the Escapee Program for all escapees.

An example of one of the special feeding programs is the post TB feeding program at Camp Valka in Germany where a special dining room and kitchen are operated to which escapees are admitted after medical examination determines that they need extra food to bolster their condition to a level where they may be able to qualify for resettlement. The escapee pays a certain amount from the relief grant given him by the German Government and the balance is financed from Escapee Program funds.

The feeding programs vary from country to country depending on the level of support accorded escapees by the local governments and on local price levels. In Italy, escapees who do not live in camps receive cash assistance from the Italian Government in the amount of only $6.40 per month to cover all living expenses. Hence, the Escapee Program furnishes a considerable food supplement at an average cost of $10 per month per person for free-living escapees in Italy, whereas at the other extreme, a food program is unnecessary in Trieste. In Turkey, as the local authorities furnish very little food to the escapees, charitable agencies and the Escapee Program must furnish all their food. Effective use has been made of CARE packages which relieve the Program of packaging and distribution costs.

Insofar as possible, the feeding program is adapted to individual tastes, particularly for out-of-camp escapees, who are given tickets worth a certain amount at selected grocers who, in turn, are reimbursed by the Escapee Program In Italy, kosher food packages are distributed to out-of-camp Jewish escapees. In camps where individual cooking facilities are not available and mass feeding is necessary, committees of escapees advise on food and feeding problems.

D. Clothing

The escapee usually arrives in the country of first asylum with little more than the clothes he wears. Although basic support from governments of asylum countries includes such items as food and shelter, there is usually little or no clothing contribution. The Escapee Program provides him with adequate clothing, often immediately upon arrival.

In addition to the physical necessity to be clothed, the provision of adequate clothing has a most salutary effect upon the escapee's morale. The deleterious effect of camp life and of not being able to support himself is considerably offset when the escapee can take pride in his personal appearance and present himself well-clad to migration selection missions where appearance and general attitude are important.

Generally, the clothing projects of the Escapee Program furnish clothing on a basis of need. Voluntary agency officials review the needs of each escapee and certify to those needs; the Escapee Program furnishes clothing to the escapee as an individual to meet his own needs and desires. Prices and standards vary somewhat in the several countries. In addition to the local purchase of clothing, U.S. Government surplus clothing is utilized when practicable.

In addition to this general clothing program, the Escapee Program makes special issues of clothing when this is desirable either for purposes of exploitation or to serve the interests of other agencies. For example, the Bulgarian ballet team of Kovacs and Rab were outfitted completely when they escaped from East Berlin in order that they might pursue their careers; they were able to report over RFE and VOA on the welcome given them in the West and to tour Europe and the United States (where they have twice appeared on nation-wide TV shows) as successful escapees. Clothing is given to new arrivals immediately upon their arrival at the MIS interrogation center in Linz, Austria. MIS has reported that the cooperation and willingness of the escapees has been increased thereby.

E. Lodging

The Escapee Program improves the physical condition of escapee camps.

The Program in Austria has arranged with the Austrian Government for the establishment of two escapee centers at Wels and Salzburg. This concentration of escapees permits a more effective effort to improve their living conditions and to qualify them for resettlement. The improved surroundings raise morale. The Austrian Government furnishes the property and the Escapee Program shares with the government the cost of operation.

The Escapee Program has installed community laundries in the major centers, which not only launder the escapees' clothing and the camp bedding and linen, but employ many escapees on a rotation basis.

In Greece all camps have been decontaminated, stoves and fuel have been provided, double-deck beds have replaced the old wooden vermin-infested bunks, and living quarters have been rebuilt and showers installed. Additional training and recreation facilities have been constructed at Escapee Program expense.

A somewhat similar program to fit the special needs of the single camp in Turkey is under way. In Italy the Program has established a special camp for eligibles formerly housed in detention camps together with common criminals. In Germany improvements have been made in Camp Valka and other centers, and in Berlin a separate escapee reception center has been set up to care for those who defect to that city.

In Germany where the majority of the Red Army defectors reside, special consideration has been given to the escapees from the USSR. At Kaiserslautern, Karlsfeld, and in Munich, separate facilities are maintained where this group can be given individual attention and intensified training to qualify them for resettlement. Here efforts are made to find jobs and private housing for those unable to emigrate, and thus to resettle them locally.

F. Medical and Health Services

The Escapee Program undertakes to bring the escapee up to and maintain him in such a state of health that he will be able to satisfy the medical requirements of the migration missions of resettlement countries .

Living conditions behind the Iron Curtain have deteriorated to such an extent and physical well-being has so often been neglected completely that many escapees arrive in the country of asylum in such poor health that they cannot qualify for resettlement.

The Program tries in several ways to improve the physical conditions of escapees. Medical prostheses projects provide needed artificial limbs; dental and optical corrections; together with orthopedic, abdominal, back, or other medical assistance. Other projects provide special medicines such as streptomicin, penicillin, liver extract and calcium, which are scarce in asylum countries or too expensive for the escapee to purchase. Necessary hospitalization is also provided.

Special projects are undertaken when circumstances warrant. Mrs. Kapus, whose foot was blown off by a mine while she was crossing the Czech border, was treated completely at Escapee Program expense of about $4,500. This cost included hospitalization, surgery fees for amputation and skin grafting, prostheses; the complete costs of treating her for gangrene in both legs, kidney infection, lockjaw, and osteomylitis. The more recent case of Laszlo Morothy, who also lost a foot in a mine explosion while escaping has also been treated at Escapee Program expense. Both of these cases were exploited around the world to the considerable advantage of U.S. interests.

G. Amenities and Special Projects

The Escapee Program Welcome Kit is in use in every country of first asylum. Since the majority of escapees are unable to bring personal items with them, a Welcome Kit containing toilet and personal items is distributed to new arrivals as a gesture of welcome. The kit also contains a card printed in several languages which indicates that the kit is a gift from the people of the United States. A Departure Kit is given to persons being resettled. It is a plastic wallet containing writing materials, compartments for passports, tickets, baggage tags, etc., and a ball-point pen. These two tokens issued at the two key points in an escapee's life -- the time of his escape and the time of his departure for a new home -- have been quite successful in demonstra American friendship for him and his countrymen.

Vacation health projects have been initiated for undernourished escapees. The neediest children are sent to Switzerland where they are placed in recreational homes and receive expert care under the guidance of trained personnel.

Due to wide-spread population problems, it has been particularly difficul for Russian escapees in Germany to secure employment and special consideration is given to this group. A pilot project for increasing employment has been undertaken at Kaiserslautern, Germany, where a voluntary agency has erected a temporary demountable barracks, which houses approximately 44 Russians. After appropriate clearances, escapees are referred to the industrial area, assigned living accommodations in the barracks and immediate steps are taken to adjust each person to his job, primarily with the military forces. Subsequently efforts are made to locate private housing in the local economy for the escapee worker and his family. Through this procedure the agency expects to find housing and employment for 100 persons. Similar projects are in effect at Karlsfeld and in Munich where separate facilities are maintained to give this group individual attention and intensified training.

Special programs or activities are undertaken on various special occasions in the interest of affording the escapees a more normal existence and confirming them in their choice of freedom. At Christmas, an entire program of activities for the escapees is planned, including Christmas dinners, Christmas gifts, plays and religious celebrations, entertainment by American troops or civilian groups, and activities with local authorities. In the interest of better community relations, one group of escapees is repainting a nearby orphanage for Christmas the Escapee Program supplied the paint. Another group is making and repairing t for the children of a nearby community. Special celebrations are held at Easter and on Jewish holidays. Recreation trips are sometimes given as when 55 escapee were taken from Mercatello to Assisi to celebrate the birthday of St. Francis on October 4, 1953. Sports equipment and sports fields have been provided. In Italy, escapees from inland camps are brought in summertime for visits to Mercatello-by-the-Sea. Such activities as these have been effective in raising the escapees' contentment in the West, with little added expense to the Program.

H. Resettlement

The Escapee Program commenced operations at a time when overseas resettlement was at a low ebb around the globe. The International Refugee Organization

had been terminated on January 31, 1951; the U.S. Displaced Persons Act had expired except for limited admittances under Section 3(c); Australia had taken a greater number of immigrants than it was able to place in housing and jobs and had generally slowed its immigration program; the Canadian economy had suffered a set-back through the hoof and mouth disease which affected their agricultural balance adversely so that they were unable to accept any substantial numbers of immigrants; regular immigration to the U.S. was slow, if not impossible for refugees who had to qualify for admission under quotas severely limited by the mortgaging of future quotas under the Displaced Persons Act. Many of the quotas were subscribed for 20 or 30 years in advance.

Hence, the Escapee Program found mass resettlement of escapees impossible and had to devote its attention to individual migration.

Movement of an individual migrant requires the preparation of a detailed dossier containing his documentation: health certificate, birth certificate, marriage license, certificate of skill, photographs of family, all of the information which a potential sponsor would require before electing to bring in a workman. The dossiers must then be despatched to the overseas affiliate of a voluntary agency which must farm the documents out to various potential sponsors until one is located whose need matches the qualifications of the escapee. The sponsor must then contact the local government which will issue a visa authorization if the applicant meets governmental standards. That visa authorization must then be notified to the Consulate of the country concerned in the area where the escapee is living, and the escapee must then qualify according to Consulate standards. This procedure, especially for the natives of Communist countries who are suspect by both asylum and resettlement nations, is understandable time-consuming and costly.

In these circumstances, in addition to all of the steps to qualify the escapee for resettlement, it was necessary for the Escapee Program to increase the rate of resettlement by undertaking contracts with voluntary agencies to locate sponsors for escapees in Latin America and Canada. The Program has contracts with Czech and Ukrainian agencies whose constitutients are numerous in Canada and with Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations to locate sponsors among their religious affiliates in Latin America. In addition, the Escapee Program has agreed to meet the inland costs of transportation in Latin America to the end destination of the escapee in order that the sponsor will not be called upon to meet this expense. The Escapee Program has taken every advantage of the opportunity offered under Section 3(c) for certain limited classes of escapees to enter the United States.

Despite the necessity to find individual opportunities for individual escapees to resettle, by November 30, 1953, 7,316 escapees had been resettled. Of these, the majority came to the U.S.A., with Canada, South America and Australia accepting escapees in that order. Detailed resettlement statistics by country of immigration and agency are included in Part 3.

The largest single category of escapee emigrants have been these 3(c) cases. Although a majority of them escaped prior to 1948, 35% of this group have been persons who have escaped since 1948 and who are of immediate interest to the Escapee Program. The Program has continued to finance the cost of resettling these cases in the interest of keeping resettlement moving, of keeping trained staff on the job, of seeing that some persons, even though they may be of relatively low priority, are immigrated in order that the escapees may see that there is hope of eventual resettlement. Secondly, although the 3(c) cases who arrived before 1948 are not of primary importance, yet they are in fact escapees and recognized as such in U.S. immigration legislation, and negative conditions affecting this group when utilized for propaganda purposes behind the Iron Curtain have just as disadvantageous an effect as do unfortunate circumstances surrounding the newer arrivals. It is

as a step toward alleviating this negative factor for persons qualifying as escapees under the U.S. Displaced Persons Act that the Escapee Program has and is continuing to process these Section 3(c) cases. In addition, under Section 3(c) the Escapee Program is able to immigrate certain Russians who are eligible for Escapee Program assistance who escaped after January 1, 1945. It should be pointed out that these 3(c) cases are eligible only for resettlement assistance and that they are not given the benefits of large scale care and training activities which are available to other escapees.

The effect of the Refugee Relief Act on the Escapee Program will be favorable since it will allow numbers of escapees to enter the U.S. However, this Act will not be effective in the field until Fiscal Year 1955, since the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State estimates that it will be July of 1954 before escapees begin to move under the provisions of this Act. A full discussion of the correlation between the Refugee Relief Act and the Escapee Program will be found in Section VII.

I. Training

Countries of immigration require skilled workmen; the Escapee Progra provides escapees with skills, as well as training them in the languages of resettlement countries and orientation about conditions in these countries. In addition, this training provides relief from long days of inactivity which is a important morale-building factor.

Vocational training is given in dressmaking, tailoring, radio repair, auto repairing and driving, carpentry, hairdressing, metal work, cabinet work, shoe repairing, electric and arc welding, agriculture, blacksmithing, and other skills.

Language training is given in all countries where the Program operate Instruction is given in English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. The language of the country of asylum also is taught.

The orientation program is essentially a visual education activity through which the escapee learns about Western countries and life in the free world.

J. Legal Aid

While legal aid is very important to the individual escapee, it is not an important factor either financially or operationally to the Escapee Program as a whole.

Protection of the legal rights of the escapee in the country of asylu is the general responsibility of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The legal aid given by the Escapee Program generally provides for preparation of legal documents and the taking of legal actions required to qualify an escapee for resettlement. For instance, the Escapee Program might assist an escapee to acquire a legal separation from an estranged wife which would enable him to resettle although she remains behind. Comparatively small legal assistance programs have been undertaken in Austria, Greece, and Turkey.

K. Transportation

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) undertakes the overseas and inland transportation of all escapees at the request of the Office of Field Coordination in Frankfort. Under a contract now in force the Committee arranges for the transportation of designated escapees from their places of residence within Europe to the port of entry in the country of resettlement at a flat rate of $125 per person. The Committee also arranges for the transportation of the comparatively small number of persons resettled within Europe.

The Escapee Program also has contracts with ICEM which provide for the transportation of escapees within Europe at an average cost of $72 per person and for transporting escapees from the Middle East and Near East to Europe at an average cost of $100 per person.

L. Visa Processing

Visa processing costs include the cost of the visa and transit visas; travel costs to and from consulates for interviews; photographs; birth, marriag and divorce certificates; police certificates; translations; notarizations; medical examinations; inoculations; blood tests; and other costs.

Visa processing and documentation projects are in operation in all countr where the Program operates. Differences in costs exist between countries becau of differences in the contributions of the local governments. Germany makes substantial contributions to the visaing costs of escapees. In Trieste, Austri Italy and Greece, the government assists to a lesser extent, while the Turkish Government makes no contribution at all.

M. Counselling

To expedite the early resettlement of the maximum number of escapees requ that a plan for this final establishment be worked out with each escapee. The process by which this plan is formulated is known as counselling. This service includes interviews with the escapees on individual and family problems in orde to obtain the fullest possible data concerning his background, family situation present and past health records, vocational abilities, attitudes toward emigration, and to locate relatives or others living abroad who might sponsor him for resettlement. The final result of the counselling service is the preparation of a history giving the background of the individual or family including pertinent health, experience, and education factors together with a plan of procedure for the case.

The histories are referred by the agencies to their representative in countries of resettlement for the purpose of locating sponsors for the immigration of the individual or escapee family. In addition to furthering the possibilities for resettlement, this service also facilitates escapee employment.

It is through the counsellor's personal interest in his individual problems, and the attention given to his particular needs, that America's concern for each and every escapee is demonstrated to him, thus offering a concrete basis for refutation of Communist charges of neglect and unconcern for the welfare of those few captives who manage to escape from Communist restraint.

N. Integration

In spite of the resettlement efforts it appears evident that a certain percentage of escapees cannot be resettled outside their present country of asylum. Unfortunately many of those non-resettleables constitute the one remaining obstacle to resettlement of other members of the family. They are the blind, the aged, and those with incurable diseases or afflictions. These cases must be cared for, either in special institutions or sufficient income must be provided them to enable them to meet their needs privately. As these cases are identified, a solution within the country of asylum is sought consonant with their individual needs and requirements.

V. FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS

A. Type of Program

It was considered important to extend activities to the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East in order to provide a broader geographical base for carrying out specific US political, psychological warfare, and intelligence objectives through the medium of assistance to escapees. This was done through the initiation of programs for special groups on a limited basis, with priorities and scope determined by the definable contribution which such target programs could make to US objectives, and in full recognition of the fact that the overall refugee and escapee problems in some of these areas are not capable of complete solution. Firm eligibility criteria such as are applied in Europe are not feasible in these areas; in general, however, preference is given to groups or individuals who are recent refugees, and who in some respect offer specific advantage to the United States. Assistance is further limited to permanent resettlement or to other aid which does not involve the US in a continuing commitment.

This approach to operations in areas outside of Europe was approved by the PSB(D-18 a/5) in connection with its review of the Escapee Program budget submission for Fiscal Year 1954. The two illustrative projects outlined at that time, namely resettlement assistance for approximately 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang who were granted asylum in Kashmir, and for a limited number of the most highly trained and educated of the estimated 1.25 million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, are now in operation.

B. Kazakhs

With respect to the Kazakh refugees, it is noted that consonant with current NSC policy, it is in the interest of the US to encourage and exploit areas of potential friction between the USSR and Communist China. Sinkiang Province, which has long been a source of contention between Russia and China, is a notable example of such areas of potential friction. In addition to its strategic location, Sinkiang has had a long history of resistance to both Chinese and Russian encroachment. The racial minority groups living there are among the most intensely nationalistic of Central Asia. Various ethnic groups in Sinkiang have made repeated appeals to US officials, notably the late J. Hall Paxton, for United States moral, economic, and political support. It was fortunate that an opportunity was presented for cultivating their friendship and political assistance at relatively little cost. Under a project in the initial amount of $20,000, 222 of the group of 300 refugees have been granted Turkish entry permits and have moved or are awaiting transportation. Plans initially made for the local resettlement of the remaining 78 refugees were cancelled by reason of the recent political changes in Kashmir, and alternative arrangements are currently being developed in conjunction with Embassy New Delhi and the Council of American Voluntary Agencies in India.

The Escapee Program has provided transportation and interim care, and has assisted in securing Turkish entry permits. Communist sensitivity to this aid and to the articulate anti-Communism of the refugees has been demonstrated by a leftist-inspired propaganda campaign which: (a) played up the suspicion that the refugees are a fifth column for foreign "imperialists"; and (b) agitated among Kashmiri refugees in Srinagar and the local poor to stir up criticism of the assistance given the Kazakhs.

C. The Far East

In the Far East, the Escapee Program has a contract with Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc. (ARCI) in the amount of $250,000 for the resettlement of selected refugees from Hong Kong to Taiwan and to other suitable areas. In view of the sensitive political situation in Hong Kong and of the large number of refugees already there, the British Colonial authorities have stipulated that there be no publicity concerning the US Government's participation in this effort. Within this frame work, ARCI assistance to the intellectual group has made an initial contribution to a redress of the negative psychological climate in Hong Kong. It also provides a basis for further U. S. programs

to develop and maintain the intellectual group as an effective leadership force which would serve as a source of democratic ideas and as an expression of the aspirations for freedom of the mainland Chinese, and which would be available as a leadership cadre in the event of a change in regime on the mainland.

The ARCI resettlement program was commenced in the late spring of 1953, and has already shown highly promising results. Major concessions in the administrative procedures for entry into Taiwan were secured by action of the Executive Yuan, and the current monthly resettlement rate has reached an average of 475 family groups comprising 575 persons. It is estimated that by December 31,1953, 3,006 family groups comprising 3,729 persons will have been resettled. Within the overall resettlement program, the special arrangements made for 200 leadership trainees are worthy of particular mention in relation to the objectives of the program. These young men, who had completed part of their higher education, were selected by a written examination conducted in Hong Kong by arrangement with the Chinese Ministry of Education, for an average of 1 and one-half years of further training by the Institute of Public Administration and by the School of Administration, Youths' Service Corps. Upon completion of these courses trainees are guaranteed positions within, or under the auspices of the Chinese Government. This project assumes particular significance in light of the extreme shortage of higher educational facilities available to Chinese in the Far East, which fact has caused a substantial number of students from among the Hong Kong refugees and the overseas Chinese to return to Red China.

Future plans in the Far East require the development of additional practicable projects which will broaden the coverage and scope of present activities. Among the areas proposed for intensive evaluation are: (1) Support projects including medical clinics, in connection with the issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953; (2) self-liquidating or non-repetitive projects directed toward provision of housing and gainful employment for refugees who must remain in Hong Kong.

D. The White Russians

Also included in the Escapee Program proposal for FY 1955 is a partial contribution to the funds required for transportation of European refugees permitted to leave Communist China, of whom it is estimated that there were somewhat less than 18,000 on July 31, 1953. Approximately 12,000 of these may be considered potential migrants. Most of this group are White Russians in the Shanghai-Tientsin-Harbin areas, who have lived in Nationalist China for many years, and whose anti-Communism as a group is well-known. Many have been forced in recent years to cooperate with the Soviet authorities in order to secure or retain employment. The Migration Committee is administering a resettlement program financed by an allocation from the IRO Trust Fund on behalf of these European refugees, who have succeeded in departing from China into Hong Kong.

The number who leave China, however, is limited by the numbers of visas available through subsidized resettlement efforts of the voluntary agencies. Under present estimates, these residual IRO funds will be exhausted shortly and the visa opportunities in prospect will be wasted or will dry up should no further financial means be found for continuation of the program. Unless some funds are found to extend the activities on behalf of this group, who are excluded completely from local relief assistance, the alternative is to condemn them to slow starvation at the hands of the Chinese Communists. Most of the group are living from the sale of personal effects or on modest relief assistance provided by the UNHCR, and no opportunity exists for other than most menial employment.

This situation, which has developed in acute form since the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway and more recently the Tschurin Company, from the USSR to CPR deprived the Harbin group of employment, has commanded world-wide attention among religious, voluntary agency, and international groups as perhaps the most urgent refugee problem currently presenting itself. While these agencies are anxious to cooperate in programs on behalf of indigenous refugees in the Far East, they are not willing to see the abandonment of the European refugees when a practical solution to their problem is available. Inclusion of

2,000 non-quota visas for alien refugees in the Far East in the Refugee Relief Act has also indicated a serious Congressional concern in the situation.

U. S. interest in assuring the resettlement of this group derives from the following:

(1) the group offers a useful source of social and economic intelligence concerning conditions in China, and of first-hand accounts of Chinese Communist oppressive measures, in contrast to the conditions under the previous government, for psychological exploitation.

(2) the CPR, by permitting European refugees to leave China, has clearly shifted to the free world the responsibility for the fate of this group, and in the light of overall U. S. objectives of maintaining the high prestige and faith in the moral leadership of the U. S. among the captive populations of the Soviet orbit, it is urgent that this challenge not go unmet; and

(3) the specific assistance rendered under this rescue operation will provide convincing factual material for exploitation behind the Iron Curtain.

It is considered essential that adequate funds be available for the outward movement of these European refugees from China through Hong Kong so long as the CPR is willing to permit members of this group to leave China and the U.K. authorities in Hong Kong are willing to grant asylum. In this connection it is noted that there have been recent indications contained in intelligence reports to the effect that USSR Consular Officers in China have an increasing interest in requiring the return of the younger members of the White Russian community to the Soviet Union. It is the assumption of the officers concerned in the Department of State that this interest is based on need for young persons who are ethnic Great Russians with a background in the Far East, capable of being trained for administrative posts in the Far East. This motivation is in contrast to the Soviet repatriation efforts in the immediate postwar period which resulted in the liquidation of the persons concerned.

E. The Middle East

In the Middle East, a detailed survey of escapees from Communism has been conducted by review of voluntary agency reports, field inquiries, and a contract study undertaken under program auspices by the Tolstoy Foundation. The results of this survey, which are now being compiled for interagency distribution indicate approximately 3,000 Russian refugees, primarily in Iran, who are in need of resettlement assistance. The great majority of these persons fled the U.S.S.R. 20 years or more ago, and a decision must be made as to whether assisting them will offer substantial value to the program. There are indications of a very limited number of new Soviet escapees in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, but the extreme sensitivity of the receiving governments on political and security grounds militates against any overt U. S. interest in these groups.

Activities in areas other than Europe have been provided for by direct relationships with the cooperating voluntary agencies in the U.S. and by instruction of the diplomatic missions concerned. This arrangement has proved reasonably satisfactory with the limited number of projects now in operation. The growing activity in the Hong Kong area, and the immediate requirement for firm programming in fiscal year have indicated the need for an intensive field survey, which will commence in January, 1954, and the probably permanent assignment of one officer in the Far East to handle Escapee Program matters.

VI. INDIRECT VALUES OF ESCAPEE PROGRAM

The accomplishments of the Escapee Program in improving their standards of living and in resettling escapees have effectively disposed of the negative atmosphere in the countries of first asylum which was adversely prejudicing the attainment of basic U. S. objectives. It is now demonstrated that, after all, the West is a desirable place to which to flee and with which to cooperate. Moreover, in underwriting part of the cost to countries of first asylum for the care of escapees, and in actively promoting their early resettlement, the Escapee Program has helped assure political asylum and proper treatment for any defector. This is recognized in NSC 86/1 as an important U. S. objective.

An awareness by the captive populations of the availability of prompt, humane asylum in the West in a time of peace will, in a time of open hostilities, increase the unreliability of the enslaved people from the Soviet point of view. It is thus important that the fact that asylum and humane treatment are, as a matter of course, available to escapees be known and understood in the Iron Curtain countries. Certainly the intent of the Soviets to convince their people that asylum cannot be found in the West is manifest. The MIG pilot who defected from the North Korean forces reported that he had desired to escape for several years, but that he had been convinced by Communist propaganda that if he did so he would be placed under detention in the West. The Czechs who escaped in the Freedom Tank came equipped with tents and bedding to avoid the misery alleged by Communist propaganda to exist in refugee camps operated by the West German Government. An RFE broadcast concerning the reaction of Lila Cloud after her escape in the Freedom Tank stated: "Mrs. Cloud was also affected by Communist propaganda which always says that nobody cares a hoot in either Austria or Germany about refugees. The greater her surprise and delight to see . . . on arriving in Germany . . . all the care given to the passengers of the tank who were showered with solicitude on the part of PEP (Escapee Program). Mrs. Cloud's eyes brimmed with tears upon recounting the kindness of the Americans."

The Soviet aim is also evident in their insistence upon the inclusion in the Italian Peace Treaty of provision for the detention in Italy of Soviet refugees; in the repeated demand for the inclusion in the Austrian Peace Treaty of an article enforcing repatriation of displaced persons and refugees; and in their efforts to assure a provision in the Korean Truce Agreement for the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

It is in this context that the values of the Escapee Program should be appraised, not only in providing a better atmosphere for escapees as a result of its own projects but, just as importantly, in influencing local governments to adhere to the principle of political asylum and to assure adequate levels of care for those who must seek it.

The effect of the Escapee Program upon the governments of the countries of first asylum has been two-fold. First, it has been helpful in causing those governments to continue asylum to political refugees from the Soviet and satellite nations. The pertinent portion of NSC 86/1 reads as follows: "the turning back or improper handling of any defectors from countries under Communist control would have a very unfavorable effect on the entire defector program. Accordingly, the United States should use its influence with the governments of countries bordering the Soviet bloc in an effort to ensure that they grant asylum and proper treatment to any defector."

The major fear of asylum countries in connection with the acceptance of political refugees is that they will continue to accumulate and that the country giving them asylum will continue to have to bear the costs of maintaining a large number of unproductive individuals on its welfare rolls. The Escapee Program largely offsets these fears of the host governments because the fact that the Escapee Program is able to resettle larger numbers than are arriving has been demonstrated. This has encouraged host governments to liberalize their policies of asylum. In Germany new arrivals are no longer tried for illegal border crossing. In Austria, in the American zone, they are no longer tried or fined and the Escapee Program is continuously negotiating both with the British and French and with the Austrian authorities to secure more lenient treatment in the British and French zones of Austria. These discussions have had only limited success to date; hence the great majority of escapees now come to the U. S. zone where they

are assured of asylum. In Greece the number of roll calls in the camps has been reduced from five a day to three per day. Escapees have been enabled to leave the confines of the camps in Lavrion to attend agricultural and vocational training schools. A recent report from Greece states that "when plans for vocational training were initially discussed with the Aliens Department, there was a strong reluctance upon the part of the Government to agree to any training project which would take refugees out of the camps at Chios and Lavrion. However, through continued negotiation the government was finally convinced of our sincerity regarding vocational training and its relationship to resettlement of political refugees outside of Greece.

"Yet this did not occur until later in the Spring of 1953 . . . It appears that we have now survived this test of faith as discussions with the Government are proceeding satisfactorily in respect to the expansion of vocational training facilities for escapees."

The second way in which the Escapee Program has been instrumental in increasing local government interest in refugees has been by focusing their attention upon the conditions of the escapees resident within their borders. The negotiation of contracts between the Escapee Program and the local governments has made it necessary for governmental authorities to become acquainted with the refugee situation. The bettering of the condition of the escapees has shown the governments the deficiencies of their own programs. A recent despatch from the Escapee program in Italy reported: "Since the inception of the Escapee Program in Italy in August, 1952, there has been a marked increase in the interest shown by the various Italian governmental agencies in the problem of refugees in Italy as well as an increasing awareness that the present lot of these refugees needs re-examination . . .

"As a result of the close working relationship between the USEP and the International Aid Administration and the Italian Government, that Administration has inaugurated several improvements in their care of ineligible refugees, patterned largely on the aid that the Escapee Program is giving. They have, for instance, improved the general level of the medical assistance given to all refugees living in their camps. They have also in recent weeks examined the camps where some of the hard-core IRO cases are kept and as a result of the conditions found there, are planning

to close the camp. It is doubtful that this examination would have taken place if the Escapee Program had not received several complaints from the inmates and turned them over for AAI for action.

"In recent weeks the Escapee Program has received from officials of AAI several different proposals for cooperation between AAI and the U. S. Escapee Program in undertaking projects for the benefit of escapees. This is a new development since, until most recently, all initiative for improving conditions for eligibles came from USEP."

Although the standard of care given to refugees in Trieste by the Allied Military Government has been high, yet the activities of the Escapee Program, coming at a time when interest in refugees in the area had generally died down, has been reported as having had the following effects on AMG's attitude: (1) An improvement in care, maintenance and counselling of eligible escapees through escapee program projects, and a corresponding improvement for non-eligible escapees through the efforts of AMG to meet the standard of USEP. (2) An improvement in the interrogation procedures through conferences among the local screening unit, peripheral reporting officer of USPOLAD and the Escapee Program. Previously certain aspects of interest to various U. S. governmental agencies such as the extent of VOA and RFE penetration, methods of escape, and motivations for escape have not been adequately explored. (3) Through the efforts of the Escapee Program, there has been an improvement in AMG's attitude toward voluntary agencies and increased coordination and cooperation with the agencies. (4) There has been a wider exploitation of escapee publicity material by AMG's Office of Public Affairs.

The same focusing of interest has been reported in Germany. "When the Federal Republic was first informed of the formation of the Escapee Program in Germany, the Chancellor responded by requesting that this aid be extended to include East Zone refugees, practically ignoring the positive aspects of the new Mission. At the same time, at the conference to explain the Program to the working officers of the ministries, the German participants showed little or no real interest.

"Now, little over one year later, the picture has changed considerably. The primary evidence of this is the fact that Ministry officials seek out the staff of the division at all levels when any problems arise . . The same cooperative attitude was apparent in the way the Interior Ministry officers received and acted on the informal representations made by HICOG on the subject of confining refugees pending their screening. The delay in closing the gates of the screening area has been attributed to the serious considerations given our viewpoint on this subject.

". . . State Secretary Oberlaender and his colleagues have assisted in the planning and implementation of several projects including the ones at Kaiserslautern and Karlsfeld. Without the help and goodwill of German officials neither of these projects could have been developed. At Kaiserslautern, particularly, the local officials were at first lukewarm on the idea of bringing Russian escapees into the area. Once the project was on its way, however, they enthusiastically helped provide employment in the local economy when difficulties arose on the placement of escapees with U. S. Military establishments . . ."

From Austria it has been reported that "The Program may take credit for the continued high level maintenance of refugee installations in Upper Austria where the Escapee Reception Center has created a standard. Repairs to other camps have been made voluntarily where ordinarily they otherwise would not".

Although the Escapee Program has had little success in inducing the Turkish Government to take greater interest or concentrate its attention on non-Turkish refugees, yet it has been successful in securing the accreditation of a Protestant Christian voluntary agency in Turkey. The Program has reported from Istanbul that "The most predominant argument for the program here in Istanbul is not so much that of a positive reaction created by the existence of the Program, but that of the negative or adverse propaganda that would result from the Communist press if the Escapee Program Division were not operating in Turkey."

A concomitant effect of the Escapee Program has been to re-direct the attention of the voluntary agencies toward the escapees and toward resettle-

ment. Following the termination of the International Refugee Organization and prior to the inception of the Escapee Program, in some areas the voluntary agencies had completely discontinued assistance to the non-native group. In all Escapee Program areas the voluntary agencies now have directed their attention toward the escapees. They have reconstituted their resettlement staffs and have instituted procedures and methods which will be useful to the processing of escapees and others under the Refugee Relief Act. The voluntary agencies under Escapee Program direction are now a positive force on the European scene and are working effectively for all refugees and in particular for the escapee group.

Section VII. - Services to other Organizations

A. The Refugee Relief Act and the Escapee Program

Operations under the Refugee Relief Act will begin to have an impact upon the Escapee Program during FY 1955. The Refugee Relief Act contains a potential for the admission over a three-year period of 67,000 persons who are of primary interest to the Escapee Program. (35,000 escapee visas authorized for Germany and Austria; 10,000 escapee visas for the NATO countries 15,000 visas for ethnic Greek refugees; and a total of 7,000 visas authorized in the Far East). Thus, it is in the interests of the United States for these two programs to be coordinated as closely as possible, that they may better attain their separate but related objectives. It is estimated that 8,000 Escapee Program eligibles will move to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act in FY 1955.

Of the 67,000 visas potentially available to escapees during the three-year span of the Act, it is estimated that 25,000 potentially will be available in FY 1955 and 28,500 in FY 1956. But the fact that this potential exists does not mean that all will be available to the escapees with whom the Escapee Program is concerned.

The definition of escapee under the Refugee Relief Act is far broader than that used by the Escapee Program.

Thus, for the 35,000 visas allocated to escapees residing in the area of the German Federal Republic or the Western sectors of Berlin or Austria the Escapee Program eligibles will be in competition with the 1,200,000 East German refugees who have fled the Soviet Zone of occupation, and with the 200,000 displaced persons who remained after the cessation of IRO's activities. In these circumstances, it is believed that the escapees' advantage in the form of completed documentation and screening, and the fact that the Escapee Program has trained them for resettlement and will pay the cost of their transportation, will enable them to compete successfully for visas under the Act. Under the Act an escapee is a refugee who has "fled from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or other Communist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied area of Europe including those parts of Germany under military occupation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics...."

An additional 10,000 visas may be given to "escapees residing within the European Continental limits of the Member Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or in Turkey, Sweden, Iran or in the Free Territory of Trieste and who are not nationals of the area in which they reside...." Here again the escapee will be in competition with IRO residual displaced persons who are not of interest to the Escapee Program.

Of the 7,000 visas potentially available in the Far East to persons in whom the Escapee Program takes an interest; 2,000 are to "refugees, residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East...who are not indigenous to the area...."; 3,000 to "refugees....who are indigenous to the area...."and 2,000 to "refugees of Chinese ethnic origin whose passports... are endorsed by the Chinese National Government...." These seven thousand visas would appear to be available respectively to non-Chinese (mainly White Russians) escaping from China, the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, and various Chinese refugees who have been moved to Formosa from, or who still reside in, areas of the Far East other than China.

In addition, 15,000 visas are available to "refugees of Greek ethnic origin." Although the Escapee Program proposed to extend assistance to only selected persons in this group, resettlement under this quota will be in the general interests of the Program.

Increased resettlement of other refugee groups, such as the German expellees for whom 55,000 visas are available under the Act, will probably benefit the Escapee Program as asylum governments and international and voluntary agencies create resettlement mechanisms which will be available

to refugees in general, including escapees, and as mass movements under the Act reduce processing costs. This positive evidence of U. S. leadership will focus the attention of other immigrant receiving nations on their manpower needs and may well produce a corresponding increase in their efforts to meet their requirements and reduce the surplus populations of Europe.

The Escapee Program has a clear mandate to resettle escapees to countries willing to receive them throughout the world and has contracts with the voluntary agencies and ICEM to carry out this mandate. Resettlement in the U. S. under the Refugee Relief Act is regarded as the same as resettlement in any other area. Since the Escapee Program has been given funds for and charged with the responsibility (recently re-emphasized by the Congress) to resettle as large a number of escapees as possible, the expense of transporting eligible escapees to the United States is considered a bona fide charge to Escapee Program funds.

The Escapee Program contemplates no additions to its staff to coordinate its activities with the operations of the Refugee Relief Act. The Escapee Program staff now coordinates escapee activities with resettlement missions of other nations and will utilize the same staff to work with the U. S. officers carrying out the Refugee Relief Act. It is probable that the voluntary agencies will expand their staff, not primarily because of an increased escapee load, but rather to process the larger numbers of other refugees who may qualify under the Act. Any such increase will be at the agencies' expense, although the escapees may benefit from their activities.

The Escapee Program will make available to the Consulates the already completed security dossiers on eligible escapees and has been assured that this will speed the security screening required under the Act. In the course of screening eligible escapees, the two-year history required by the Act will be compiled for presentation to the Consulates. Each escapee is being trade-tested in order that his dossier may contain adequate evidence that he possess the skill he claims. All escapees are receiving medical examinations to disclose possible defects which may then be treated and overcome. Vocational training will qualify those lacking skills or whose skill needs refurbishing. English is being taught in all countries of first asylum. These activities should result in some priority for eligible escapees under the Act.

VII B. INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. How the Program Participates in Exploitation of Information.

Improvement by the Escapee Program of living conditions and resettlement opportunities for escapees will produce important benefits for U. S. political psychological warfare and intelligence objectives only if such program achievements are made known and understood behind the Iron Curtain. Such impact is attained through the dissemination of information among the captive populations by overt and covert means. Experience clearly shows that, if the effort to make the Escapee Program known behind the Iron Curtain as the symbol of hope and encouragement for the oppressed people of Eastern Europe is to be successful, the dissemination of appropriate information on the program must be carried out on a continuing and priority basis. This is done primarily through coordination with other government and non-official agencies which are responsible in general for carrying out information programs. Working in close cooperation with these agencies, the Escapee Program attempts to stimulate maximum action in the exploitation of the Program accomplishments. This is done in the first instance through planning and assessment of Program opportunities and achievements in an imaginative, resourceful, and flexible manner with a view to losing no opportunity of producing a result which will be highly exploitable. Secondly, the Program collects and disseminates among other government agencies data concerning the Program, and its operations both in terms of impersonal Program achievements and highly exploitable personal stories. Finally, the Program furnishes program advice to these information agencies in the preparation and utilization of escapee material.

It should be constantly borne in mind that the actual exploitation of the program, through overt and covert media, is of course in the nands of other agencies, and essentially beyond control or influence by the Escapee Program. Therefore, after the supporting initial action by the Program, the scope, energy and effectiveness of the various programs designed to exploit the Escapee Program depend upon the actions and policies of agencies other than the Program.

2. Specific Examples of Program Cooperation

Specifically, the Escapee Program cooperates with the overt news media in making the Escapee Program known and understood in the following ways:

a. It has taken the lead in the preparation of basic informational policy statements for the guidance of USIA and in directing the establishment of effective field relationships between USIA and Escapee Program personnel to assure the maximum appropriate utilization of Escapee Program news from items concerning Program accomplishments.

b. Since October 1952 the Escapee Program has made 84 separate referrals to USIA (principally for coverage by VOA New York) of the arrival of 5,143 escapees being resettled in the United States.

c. The Escapee Program undertook a project to develop material for VOA programming concerning successful resettlement stories in the U. S., Australia, and South America.

d. In January, 1953, Embassy Rome suggested that the development of Escapee Program news items could profitably be utilized in Italy in pre-electoral propaganda campaign. In February, 1953, Embassy Warsaw requested that VOA/Polish broadcasts give fuller treatment to the Escapee Program in order to "... buoy up and increase spirit resistance Polish people and counteract 'Communist success' themes of Polish propaganda..." The Escapee Program gave particular attention to providing fresh first hand information to USIA to service the request of Embassies Rome and Warsaw.

e. Following the return to Bulgaria of two Bulgarian escapees from Turkey in the Spring, 1953 which was effectively exploited by Radio Sofia, the Escapee Program suggested intensified VOA Bulgarian programming and provided useable information for this purpose.

f. In March, 1953 the Escapee Program undertook an information gathering project for the support of the USUN delegation in refuting the Czech resolution introduced before the Seventh General Assembly seeking to condemn the United States for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in alleged violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The

mass of detailed data, which included first hand interviews and affidavits of recent escapees, was utilized by Ambassador Lodge in turning the Czech charges into a sweeping denunciation of the Soviet-satellite political and social structure and led to an overwhelming defeat of the resolution. The material was also furnished to VOA and was the basis for substantial reportage of the Escapee Program by the domestic press.

g. In September, 1953 a second intensified information gathering project was undertaken under coordination of the Escapee Program to develop informational material to service requests such as that received from Ambassador Briggs (Seoul telegram No. 212) who urged, as a consequence of defection of a member of the Polish Truce Team, "....maximum exploitation.. since there are few things as galling to Communists as desertion from ranks. Fact of defection cannot be successfully hidden, denied or explained away and hence inevitably damaging to Communist prestige. VOA and RFE use especially to Poland and other satellites likewise recommended."

h. As of the end of November, 1953, the Escapee Program has provided VOA and the USUN delegation a total of 101 informational items and 42 photographs collected under the current information gathering project. The informational items included personal interviews, escape histories, and other stories relating to conditions behind the Iron Curtain and to border controls.

In commenting on these special information gathering projects, Mr. William Stearman, Information Analyst for USIS said:

"PAD's 'Special Information Project' is engaged in exposing Communist propaganda on a world-wide basis through the media of correspondents - especially wire service correspondents - and, indirectly, through VOA, BBC and RFE. Information from refugee sources is absolutely essential to this type of operation since there is no substitute for the eyewitness description of actual conditions behind the Iron Curtain. Refugees bring out information that is not available from any other source. Such information is essential in keeping the free world informed of the exact nature of the Communist threat and in combatting Communist attempts to lull those outside of the Soviet Bloc into a false sense of security or into complacent indifference to the lot of those enslaved by Soviet power. Our very survival depends on the alertness of the free world to the Soviet-Communist threat. In view of current all-out attempts of the Soviets and their satellites to convince the free world that a change - both internal and external - for the better has taken place, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to keep the Cold-War-weary free world alert. At this stage of the game more refugee material is badly needed, more than ever before!

'Not only do refugees bring out useful counter-propaganda material, but also the very act of risking death in crossing the physical Iron Curtain is in itself eloquent evidence of what Communist terror means at least to some people. Furthermore, these escapes are often packed with dramatic human interest which appeals to the broadest newspaper and radio audiences throughout the entire globe, on both sides of the Curtain. Look at the "Freedom Train" and the "Freedom Tank" stories; consider the widespread publicity that accompanied the Kapus, Raab (ballet dancers) and Marothy escapes. Nothing we could write on Iron Curtain conditions could better project what we're trying to say than these escapee stories.

'Should anything happen to discourage escaping to the West, our entire global counter-propaganda effort would be greatly handicapped. VOA and RFE would be even harder hit, but that is their story to tell. The interviews obtained by representatives of the Embassy and USIS from Erszebet Marothy indicated that refugees still represent a gold mine of information that has not been sufficiently tapped to date because of difficulties in reaching them. It is felt that with USEP, USCOA Liaison and MIS cooperation these difficulties will be overcome and refugees will take on an even greater importance in USIA counter-propaganda and psych-war efforts.

'Without question, the Soviet Bloc leaders are doing everything possible to discourage escaping. Those caught escaping are draconically punished. Those who might be contemplating escape are discouraged with tales of the hardships, discouragements, neglect and disinterest that await the escapee in Western Europe. USEP is certainly the best weapon VOA, RFE and other media have of disproving such tales."

i. All Escapee Program Divisions cocperate closely with VOA and RFE in supplying useable material for appropriate exploitation.

1. In Germany, the Escapee Program informs VOA of significant escapees departing for resettlement abroad far enough in advance of their actual movement from Germany to permit maximum possible exploitation by VOA. IBS/ Munich states that the most significant stories for utilization behind the Iron Curtain are those involving resettlement outside of Germany. To assure maximum programming material in this respect, an informational backgrounder is compiled by the Program on every escapee being resettled outside of Europe. Since February, 1953, VOA/Munich and RFE have been provided with 55 departure lists containing the names of 3,186 persons being resettled and with "backgrounders" on 382 families.

2. In Austria, the Escapee Program Division has been active in arranging special press coverage of newsworthy escape incidents such as that of the Ollareks, Kapus, and Marothy families and in providing background material for feature stories and editorials which have appeared in the U. S. and Austrian press and for utilization by VOA and RFE. The Program provided VOA with 60 escapees for a special survey on audience reaction. RFE depends on the Escapee Program for housing its Wels office, giving it access to all new arrivals for prolonged interviews and tape recordings. Program activities and individual cases are brought to the attention of that agency and many broadcasts have been made regarding treatment and reception by the U. S. Government. The Escapee Program provided USIA with photographs and captions for the preparation of a pamphlet "Way Station to Freedom".

3. In Greece, the Escapee Program Division is in contact with USIS and has made referrals at the time of the escapees departure from Greece. Under Escapee Program auspices, USIS covered the departure of three groups - two to France and one to Canada - interviewing selected members of the group and taking shipside pictures. Liaison has been established with RFE and its representatives have visited the Lavrion Resettlement Center to interview escapees. The Escapee Program Division in Greece prepares detailed reports of its operations which are capable of exploitation by overt informational media in making the Escapee Program known behind the Iron Curtain. The method of extracting the maximum potential value from an exploitable event is illustrated by the handling of the recent escape of two Albanians in a small boat to Corfu. The Escapee Program Division alerted the Greek and international press to the event, hired a plane to transport the reporters and news reel representatives to the Island of Corfu, and in a matter of hours the story of a dramatic escape and the role of the Escapee Program in assisting the two Albanians was being told to the world.

4. In Italy, the Escapee Program Division has cooperated with USIS by providing a substantial amount of material in pre-electoral exhibits in Rome. The VOA office in Rome has not evinced much interest in escapee news items. However, many submissions originating from the Escapee Program Division in Italy have been found useful by the Munich Radio Center. Seventy one biographical sketches of escapees have been submitted to VOA and RFE. USIA is currently working up a feature story on 15 ex-Polish diplomats now living in Rome. Feature stories on the Escapee Program in Italy have appeared in the United States and Italian press, being instigated by the Escapee Program Division. An Italian paper described the Escapee Program as an agency "...which is doing much to utilize one of the free world's most powerful weapons...the refugee from behind the Iron Curtain."